OBEs and NDEs are important phenomena pertinent to the debates about the mind–body relationship and the survival of consciousness beyond bodily death. The formal study of Near-Death Experiences started only in 1975 with Raymond Moody's ground-breaking book, *Life after Life* (Moody, 1975), but it has since mushroomed into a huge field of research that is now a subject of active interest in a wide range of disciplines, including Philosophy (e.g. Lund, 2009), Religious Studies (e.g. Fox, 2003), Anthropology (e.g. Shushan, 2009), Anomalistic Psychology (e.g. Cardeña et al., 2000, chap.10), Parapsychology (e.g. Parker, 2001), Phenomenology (e.g. Murray et al., 2009), Cardiology (Parnia et al., 2001), Neuroscience (Greyson, 2007) and Counselling (Nouri, 2008).

Although many controversies remain, no viable orthodox explanations have been proposed (Greyson et al., 2009; van Lommel, 2010). Based on NDE studies there now seems to be good evidence suggestive of lucid consciousness during cardiac arrest, involving both veridical this-worldly OBEs (Cook et al., 1998; Holden, 2009) and ‘other-realm experiences’ with veridical components (Greyson, 2010). Most NDE researchers are now convinced that consciousness, identity, memory and perception can function while the body is clinically dead (Holden, 2010, p.363)—the challenge to neuroscientific orthodoxy is “profound and inescapable” (Greyson et al., 2009, p.234).

NDEs are complex phenomena, and analysing them requires competence in a variety of disciplines. In particular, it is valuable for such researchers to have skills that span the ‘hard’ sciences and the humanities. Given this context, one would be justified in anticipating that Michael Marsh’s book would make an important contribution to the scholarly study of OBEs and NDEs. Marsh is a physician and as a mainstream biomedical researcher has published three books and more than 200 papers, and attained one full-time and four visiting professorships. Nearing retirement he undertook the present study as a DPhil thesis in Theology at Oxford (Magdalen). With his background and interests one could reasonably have expected from him a good grasp of the scientific method, medical science and religious experience, and hence an insightful treatment of NDEs, challenging as they do both conventional neuropsychiatry and dogmatic spirituality.

Unfortunately, however, Marsh comes to his investigation with two (for him) immovable philosophical commitments, and these appear to constrain his ability to regard the evidence dispassionately. Firstly, he believes, in a very
orthodox Christian way, in salvation to an everlasting life. Secondly he is a
physicalist, which means he regards the 'soul' as an emergent property of the
physical body, thus ceasing to exist when the body dies. This interesting con-
junction of ideas is not radical within Anglicanism (see, for example, Badham,
1998, p.119), but for Marsh it places severe constraints on how he can interpret
putative evidence for OBEs and for survival.

Marsh equates the soul with “personality” (p.203), and this he considers
to be emergent on, or to derive from, bodily functions and social conditioning
(pp.203, 206). On this basis he considers the death of the body to mark the end
of the soul “unless—in some way—salvaged by God” (p.203). The worthy can
be confident of this salvage, for God, at the end of days, “will recreate us when
renewing the entire cosmos” (p.209), which will be a one-off “cosmic event”
resulting in “transformation, a resurrection into a new body” (pp.210–211).
Since the soul is an aspect or property or function of a body, survival means,
for Marsh, re-creation as a new body in “the world to come” (p.213).

It is clear that within Marsh’s paradigm OBEs have to be some kind of
hallucination, as all forms of substance dualism are ruled out a priori. Further-
more, there cannot be empirical evidence for the survival of human conscious-
ness, since persons do not exist after they have died, and their replicas will not
come into existence until after the end of the present world. The trouble with
this prior position as a system of beliefs is that it led Marsh to determine an
agenda at the outset, a fact which he acknowledges with disarming frankness.
In his Introduction, he says:–

My overriding task has been to seek another way of interpreting ECE [extra-
corporeal experience] phenomenology apart from the prevailing view that it arises from
moribund brains, thus allowing the ‘inner person’ to escape and sample the delights of
the afterlife . . . it is clear that all OBE/NDE . . . are undergone in the final moments
preceding the abrupt resumption of conscious-awareness. [p.xix]

and

My overriding premise, therefore, is that OB/ND [out-of-body/near-death] pheno-
menology is not about the death of individuals nor about dying, moribund brains. On
the contrary it is about a vigorous return to life and hence the re-appropriation by
brains of their former functional competence, as the organ of conscious-awareness.
[p.xx]

This agenda is philosophically and scientifically unfortunate. He assumes
what needs to be proven, and explicitly sets out to preserve his beliefs no
matter what the evidence shows. He also disregards the established evidence
against his technical presumptions: it is clear that that OBEs and NDEs do
not only occur as subjects recover from unconsciousness. Many OBEs and
NDEs occur in the absence of physiological trauma (Kelly et al., 2007, chap.6;
von Lomme, 2004), there are good reasons to think that the confusional state
following cardiac arrest is unable to support the clear narrative content of NDEs
(Fenwick & Fenwick, 2008, p.207), and there are good reasons, even aside
from NDEs, to doubt that the brain is the “organ of conscious-awareness”,
both on philosophical grounds (Antonietti et al., 2008; Gillett & Loewer, 2001;
Koons & Bealer, 2010) and empirical grounds (Greyson, 2010; Kelly et al.,
2007; Lorber, 1965; Nahm, 2009; Nahm & Greyson, 2009). As for NDEs being
about “sampling the delights of the afterlife”, even a cursory examination of
the literature shows that many NDEs are not experiences of 'heavenly' realms
but of harrowing ones, or of vague misty environs, or are mystical unitive
experiences (Greyson, 1983, 2003; Greyson & Bush, 1992; Schwaninger et al.,
2002), and that NDE researchers are fully cognisant of the complexity and
diversity of these experiences (Atwater, 1994; Becker, 1991; Bush, 2009).

Having determined his assumptions and his agenda, Marsh sets about
choosing NDE evidence to demolish in support of both. He starts by basing
his “analysis” (which he rather grandly terms “my radical program” [p.xx]) on
just eight books, none less than 12 years old and produced by only six authors
(Moody, Sabom, Ring, the Fenwicks and Grey)! The inadequacy of this is clear:
NDE researchers have over the last 30 years produced hundreds of books,
including more than 20 scholarly publications summarising research trends
and findings (cf. Holden et al., 2009, p.5), and more than 600 papers in
scholarly journals (ibid., p.9). These include more than 65 research studies
conducted by more than 55 researchers or research teams, and involved nearly
3,500 NDErs (ibid., p.7). Marsh’s chosen books are by no means marginal
ones, but they are not representative of the current state of the art; the last
twelve years of research, which Marsh ignores, have seen significant develop-
ments in case material, analysis and sophistication in the debate about the
implications of these experiences for the philosophy of consciousness (see, for
example, Holden et al., 2009; van Lommel, 2010).

Marsh’s treatment of specific cases is perplexing. Noting (pp.123–124) that
Sabom reports six cases of OBEs that included veridical perception of “specific
focused details exclusive to their individual resuscitations” (Sabom, 1982,
pp.83–115), he finds himself unimpressed. He wants to dismiss these cases
because the observed details were “trivial”, e.g. the shape of the defibrillator
electrodes, or the dials and knobs on a machine, or a nurse’s hairdo (p.124).
And yet, some of the details were striking, and highly relevant to the percipient:
for example, one patient correctly reported that the doctor she had been told
would be performing the surgery was, in fact, only present and advising the
doctor actually performing it (Sabom, 1982, pp.99–102); in another case,
Sabom calls the patient’s description of what his exposed heart looked like “a
classic” (ibid., p.99). Marsh ignores these striking details, which contradict his
contention that the details were all trivial. In any case, surely the salient point
is that someone could report the actual details, not how unusual the details
were?

Rather than looking at the evidence to evaluate what it might mean, Marsh
criticizes it simply for not being possible in the light of his starting assumptions
noted above. The celebrated Pam Reynolds case (Sabom, 1998) is dismissed as
“most unimpressive and distinctly uninformative. It fails to offer any new
insights or novel data pertinent to the field of ECE phenomenology” (p.26). He
repeatedly dismisses interpretations of her experience as coincident with her
anaesthesia or cardiac arrest, claiming it is “impossible, from any physiological
perspective” and “absurd” and “without any warrant” (p.25). The Reynolds
case is sometimes overrated, but it is a landmark case with many interesting
features — it was given four pages of discussion in Irreducible Mind (Kelly
et al., 2007, pp.392–394, 418–419), and was there identified as “[a] case
which conspicuously exemplifies numerous features difficult to account for

227
in conventional psycho-physiological terms . . . [the] case is also particularly important because Sabom, a cardiologist, was able to obtain verification from attending medical personnel concerning some critical details of the operation that the patient reported observing during her experience” (ibid. p.392).

Marsh’s attitude reflects his physicalistic position, stated in his Introduction and cited above (p.xx). As he goes on, he repeatedly claims that all ECEs must be cerebral in origin, simply on the grounds that the subjects have memories of them (pp.25, 53, 72, 78, 124, 206, 261). He appears oblivious to the deep philosophical problems attaching to conventional accounts of memory (Braude, 2002; Heil, 1978; Kelly et al., 2007, chap.4), the general evidence for veridical perceptions in OBEs (Kelly et al., 2007, chap.6) and the evidence for survival (Braude, 2003; Gauld, 1982). In fact he dismisses psychical research in general as having produced no evidence for psychical phenomena (p.65).

The fact that OBErs are unable to feel bodily sensations such as pain, while able to report awareness of what is going in elsewhere in the room, Marsh takes as evidence that the experience is not real (p.124). But surely, given that we have veridical cases, this supports the notion of an independently functioning mind, rather than undermining it? Lastly, he argues that:–

Whatever the conscious state of these subjects, it is evident that some data necessarily had to enter their brains, otherwise they would not have been able to recall, from later memory in their real bodies and minds, what apparently did happen.

Clearly, there were no dead brains.

But this just begs the question, and disregards important evidence. The apparent laying down of memories during cardiac arrest does not entail that doctors systematically misreport their patients’ medical conditions. In any case the content of the memories deserves an explanation aside from their presence: how, for example, could these patients report the visual appearance of their exposed heart or spine from the vantage point physically available to them (Sabom, 1982, pp.99–100)?

Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper’s important study (entitled Mindsight) of 31 reports of blind persons experiencing visual perception during OBEs and NDEs (1999) is dismissed as based on “the (mis)use of leading questions”, “the uncritical acceptance by these interrogators of superficial statements and vague responses”, and “these authors obviously confused visual sight with hallucinatory ‘sight’ actually experienced during ECE” (p.15). Marsh’s view can be contrasted with that of Stuart Twemlow, who says in his review of Mindsight that “the authors have done a marvellous job of careful introspective phenomenological dissection of the reports. This study represents an excellent piece of qualitative research” (Twemlow, 2002). Irreducible Mind makes eleven references to Ring’s research, including two to the Mindsight findings (Kelly et al., 2007, pp.389, 603), but in none of these is Ring’s competence or methodology questioned. Mindsight is by no means perfect, but granted the inherent difficulties in this type of study, I think this research was carefully and well done, and dealt competently with the technical and philosophical issues at stake.

The snide tone of Marsh’s comments quoted above is pervasive throughout the book. He appears to be propping up his agenda by this use of dismissive and emotive language: Moody is a “raconteur” (p.4), the Fenwicks are “the
man-and-wife team” (p.8), Ring and Cooper are “interrogators” (p.15). Pam Reynolds’ body, at the conclusion of her NDE, is a “carcass” (p.15). More examples are evident in many of the quotes given below.

Marsh claims that as far as veridical reports are concerned, we have “thousands of OBE reports . . . but still no piece of convincing data on what can only be described as a most dismal and unpromising front” (p.125). This is a surprising conclusion, given the many published cases of unusual events being reported by cardiac arrest NDErs (Cook et al., 1998, pp.338–391, 399–401; Moody & Perry, 1988, pp.19–20; Morse & Perry, 1993, p.201; Ring & Cooper, 1999, pp.18–21, 71–72; Ring & Lawrence, 1993; Sharp, 1995, pp.3–16) and an analysis of more than a hundred cases of visual perception during cardiac arrest or prolonged respiratory arrest showing that 90% of them contain no errors at all (Holden, 2009, p.196). After complaining about the lack of evidence (sic), he then argues against research aimed at collecting such evidence:–

My third objection . . . arises from unwarranted attempts to read off data from a resuscitative procedure, designed to restore a life hanging precariously in the balance . . . We should not require of personnel involved in heroic life-saving procedures to make additional, reliable and clear-headed observations irrelevant to the acute problem in hand, and only to be used to permit another set of retrospective ‘investigators’ to claim that mind exists outside the body. [p.125]

Finally, Marsh finds himself persuaded by his own incredulity regarding the alternative:–

The issue of real existence outwith the brain . . . raises enormous, if not insuperable, neuro-physiological and philosophical challenges . . . for all these reasons, I do not consider the viewing of one’s body, or of resuscitatory procedures being applied to it, as an appropriate veridical ‘proof’ that any subject’s mind, soul or free consciousness has actually existed and coherently functioned in space. [pp.125–126]

This attitude is not only unscientific but overstates the philosophical challenges: there are philosophical positions that can accommodate NDEs in a naturalistic scheme (e.g. Griffin, 2000; Kelly, 2007; Rousseau, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).

Marsh’s ‘explanation’ of OBEs/NDEs, developed over Chapters 4–9, hinges on dismissing/ignoring the veridical evidence as ‘trivial’, insisting that the ECEs always occur during the recovery period (because, pace Marsh, they cannot occur during deep anaesthesia or cardiac arrest), the (uncontroversial) evidence that subconscious drives or brain malfunctions can produce hallucinations, and the (contentious) assumption that all mental phenomena are produced by the brain. Not much here need detain us, for such arguments have long been debated in the NDE literature, and shown to be either ad hoc or inadequate (see Greyson et al., 2009, for an overview). Researchers familiar with the literature are unlikely to join Marsh when he congratulates himself for having “completely neutralized, if not eradicated, [the neuro-physiological challenge presented by NDEs] by my pursuit and deployment of in-depth neuro-physiological explanation and possibility” (p.262).

Having dismissed the extensive case literature and accompanying analyses, Marsh recommends to us a “realistic Christian eschatology” (p.211), involving the re-creation of the cosmos and the replication of the worthy dead after the
end of the present world. However, Marsh’s model is the subject of familiar worries within the Philosophy of Religion, as it appears to be a logically flawed solution to puzzles about resurrection. For most Christians (as for Marsh) it is no longer doctrine that people’s original bodies will be resurrected, because science has revealed that matter is continuously recycled in nature, so that individual persons will not have been the unique historical owners of their bodily materials. Philosophers have identified many acute problem cases, for example that of the cannibal who eats the first missionary he meets but is converted by the second one. It appears that the early missionary and the pious erstwhile cannibal cannot both be resurrected as whole persons. The ‘re-creation model’, however, hardly resolves the resurrection conundrums. The argument goes that a supernatural replica of a natural person would have ‘memories’ that are exact duplicates of the authentic memories a natural person once had, and so would believe that it was the original person, and would believe that it was deserving of the rewards due to the original person. However, this would be a mistaken belief, and the rewards (or punishments) would be unearned, since the replica in fact did none of the relevant things. The receipt of concomitant rewards and punishments by the replica would reinforce its false beliefs, but could never authenticate them. If there is nothing more to people than their bodies (as Marsh advocates) then re-creation cannot count in any cogent sense as either salvation or survival. Not only that, but this model implies that the replica is intentionally and eternally deceived by God into believing that it was the authentic person. The model also impugns God’s justice in that now authentic persons are never actually rewarded or punished for what they did do, while replicas are rewarded or punished without having ever done anything good or bad. Philosophers have suggested that perhaps God whisks away the brain (or even the whole body) at the moment of death, replacing it with a replica. A replica (or part replica) is then buried and the authentic body (or the crucial part of it) is saved. However, this means the grieving relatives are now the deceived ones, so the moral issues are not resolved. The problems with these scenarios run deep, as both philosophers and theologians have pointed out (L. Badham, 2001; P. Badham, 1998, p.122; Flew, 1972, pp.133–134; van Inwagen, 1990, pp.145–148; Lund, 2009, pp.32–35; Penelhum, 1970, chap.9).

Marsh contends that, compared with his re-creation scenario, “the corpus of reported ECE material lacks conviction and hardly offers serious perspectives on the afterlife from which newer insights and reflections might follow” (p.218). I leave readers to determine for themselves which perspective they find more persuasive.

In his closing chapter, Marsh takes NDE researchers to task for neglecting the positive transformative effect that NDEs, false as they allegedly are, have on those that have them, saying:–

It is regrettable that post-ECE behaviour has been ignored, with so little recognition paid to its performance, against a misplaced enthusiasm for esoterically based, speculative interpretations oriented towards other-worldly states . . . There has been scarcely any appreciation of the implications or impact of the way in which subjects’ lives are so radically turned about through ECEs, as a means for good or the promotion of inter-societal relationship.

[p.263]
This allegation is simply incomprehensible. The transformative aspects of NDEs were noted at the outset by Moody (1975) and the results of the first systematic study were published soon after (Noyes, 1980). The research index provided by IANDS cites 133 articles on post-NDE changes in orientation to life and sense of self. For a recent review covering more than twenty major studies into this, see Noyes et al. (2009). Given this body of work, it is surprising to find Marsh railing against Ring and Grey for “tendentious” findings of a turn towards a more individually tailored spirituality and away from organised religion (p.263). Against this backdrop, one can only wonder at Marsh claiming that he has a new and important idea here, one that, if only we would take his view on board, has

the potential for a practical outcome of ECE, one outweighing any virtues that others find in a free-consciousness ascending to a fourth dimension, of promises of holographic wizardry, of the prospect of reincarnation in the hopelessness of endless biological recycling, or the finding of unity in some ill-defined ‘cosmic brotherhood’.

[p.266]

However, for all that he would leverage people’s post-NDE positive attitudes, he recommends having no truck with the origins of that transformation:–

Final salvation comes with the development of relationships that are truly revealed, not in any ECE brain-based hallucinatory commerce with an illusory ‘heaven’ or so-called ‘beings of light’. These neurally conjured beings, ill-defined in ontological status, epistemologically bereft of credible meaning, lack the credentials of the triune Persons revealed through prophet, scripture, tradition, and personal encounter.

[p.266]

Or so Marsh would have us believe. I would give more credence to his view if it rested on better scholarship, and would regard his advice with more sympathy if he showed more of the compassionate and respectful attitude to others he so admires in those whose NDEs he so disparages.


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