The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all


Reform of the United Nations (UN) is said to be like the weather: everyone talks about it, but no one can do anything about it. Following the existential crisis of the 2003 Iraq war, the reform discussions in advance of the September 2005 World Summit in New York were unusually vigorous. Intense divisions arose in particular over the expansion of the Security Council. When the dust settled, it appeared that little had been achieved.

The 'sleeper hit' of that reform effort was the doctrine known as the responsibility to protect, commonly abbreviated to ‘R2P’. One reason it survived was its apparent innocuousness. At base, it merely affirms that a state has primary responsibility for protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In the watered-down form adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly, it provided that the failure of a state to act on this responsibility might be grounds for the Security Council to act, in exceptional circumstances, in the name of the international community —something the Council had already done on a handful of occasions.

It is arguable that just as the prohibition of war in the UN Charter was the most important transformation in international law in the twentieth century, R2P may be a signal development in the twenty-first.

Two people are most responsible for R2P gaining the traction that it has. The first is Kofi Annan. As Secretary-General, he ignited heated debate over humanitarian intervention in 1999 after the Kosovo intervention and later seized on R2P as the more accurate and acceptable form of what he sought to describe. The second is Gareth Evans. The lead architect of the original report and the originator of the phrase in 2001, he used his position on another blue ribbon panel to force it onto the UN reform agenda. In his capacity as head of the International Crisis Group he has been the strongest advocate of R2P —pushing and cajoling and badgering anyone who would listen in every policy forum, media outlet and student conference that he has come within shouting distance of.
The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all draws on these experiences and some earlier writing, but looks forwards rather than backwards. Evans is fulsome on the debt that R2P owes to many others, including the various efforts of Bernard Kouchner and Tony Blair to articulate a right of humanitarian intervention, and especially Francis Deng's conception of sovereignty as responsibility. But his main concern is what happens next.

The importance of the responsibility to protect is as much rhetorical as substantive. That is not a slight. Indeed, although the form of language ultimately adopted by the General Assembly arguably diluted R2P as originally formulated, the genius of the doctrine is that it has sidelined the debates over sovereignty and foregrounded victims and the obligations of states. Annan had tried to push this debate and failed. He later acknowledged that reframing the issue as R2P did 'would have given him rather more feathers with which to fly' (38).

Evans compares the rhetorical change to the role that 'sustainable development' played in bringing developers and environmentalists onto the same page in the late 1980s (42). But R2P is significantly more than that. The academic literature for many years tended to polarize around those arguing for a 'right' of humanitarian intervention and those arguing that any such right would be abused or in any case missed the point—that the problem was not the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, but the overwhelming prevalence of inhumanitarian non-intervention. This theoretical split was mirrored in governments, the vast majority of which feared attacks on their sovereignty while a few defended their right to act without conceding similar rights to others.

Bridging this divide required shifting the example from the Kosovo intervention—whose questionable legitimacy had prompted the Canadian government to fund the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in the first place—to Rwanda. Though there was great disagreement about the prudence of the former, there was no dissent about the tragedy of the latter. And as the debate moved from authorizing future Kosovos to preventing future Rwandas, it began to gain momentum.

The book has elements of a diplomatic memoir, briefly describing the arc of Evans' career beginning as a young civil society activist, politician, foreign minister and now as a 'rather older civil society activist' as president, until June 2009, of International Crisis Group (223). Unusually for the genre, there is little settling of scores. Evans is generous in his sharing of credit and slow to attribute blame for setbacks. Vitriol is reserved for leaders who seem determined to drive their countries into the ground: Robert Mugabe's 'despoliation of his own people' (72) and so on.

For the most part, however, the book is a catalogue of tools, options, strategies and exhortations to give substance to cries of 'never again'. Though at times wonkish—it offers three toolboxes (each with two trays, four compartments in each), sixty pages of endnotes—the pervading spirit is relentless optimism.

The three broad areas for action—each with its own 'toolbox'—are prevention, reaction and rebuilding. Prevention is notoriously preferred in theory and ignored in practice. Apart from traditional resistance by sovereign states to interference before things explode, it is hard to tell when prevention efforts have borne fruit; as Sherlock Holmes observed, it is difficult to establish why a dog didn't bark on a given night. Evans surveys the empirical literature with appropriate scepticism and focuses on the real issue of what can be done when a country is generally seen to be heading towards a crisis. (Crisis Group was established, in essence to raise such red flags and offer solutions.) The options available include, importantly, carrots as well as sticks; long-term structural tools as well as short-term measures.

On the question of reaction, Evans is at pains to stress — as he does throughout the book— that military action is a last resort. Kenya in early 2008 suggests a hopeful example of political and diplomatic pressure defusing (or, perhaps, delaying) a potentially catastrophic conflict; Darfur in Sudan may be an ongoing example of the limits of such pressure. With respect to rebuilding, the same World Summit that endorsed R2P created the Peacebuilding Commission, which in theory should improve the ability of the UN to carry out these functions. As Evans notes with a characteristic mix of optimism, realism and humour: 'It is unusual for intergovernmental organizations of this kind to do precisely what they are
supposed to, and even more for them to do it well, but one lives in hope' (149).

The book bursts with energy and ideas, on topics ranging from the quantitative literature on conflict prevention to public international law arguments on the use of force and transitional justice. Ultimately, however, Evans' concern is pragmatic. Taking Rwanda as the benchmark of failure, how can one encourage policy-makers to do the right thing, or at least make it harder to do nothing at all? He acknowledges the central problem of political will but has little patience for those who hide behind it: 'To explain a failure as the result of lack of political will is simply to restate the problem' (224).

Acting to mobilize political will is the subject of the final chapter and, Evans concludes, is everyone's responsibility. He ends with the 'fervent hope that even if leaders are not always born, and only on very rare occasions are elected, they can at least on occasion be made' (241).

Though the title aim of ending mass atrocity 'once and for all' is admirable, responsibility to protect—the doctrine and the book—will assuredly not guarantee that future Rwandas (or Kosovos or Iraqs) do not take place. Yet it does offer a vocabulary for activism that is not neo-colonial, a normative framework that is not antithetical to the UN Charter, and, perhaps, makes it harder for leaders to turn on their populations while others turn away.

**The invisible hand of peace: capitalism, the war machine and international relations theory**


In this important book by a new scholar, Patrick J McDonald presents a sophisticated application of liberal economic theory to a variety of international relations arguments about what generates stable peace. McDonald's basic thesis is that wealth creation generates peace because private property and competitive markets constrain political predation (rent seeking) and patrimonialism and ensure that policy makers are responsive to popular demands. It is a book that challenges simplistic notions that posit that international commerce generates peace between trading partners as well as other theories of democratic peace that are not rooted solidly in local economic dynamics.

*The invisible hand of peace* is organized into three parts. The first focuses on the peaceful consequences of liberal economic institutions and critiques the current American 'grand' strategy of exporting democracy. It also argues that the liberal peace debate challenges contemporary IR theory and traditional political philosophy by both directing attention towards the institutional regulation of the domestic economy and assessing the external consequences of this. The second section provides some very interesting empirical confirmation of the links between private property, competitive markets and peace, and suggests how these dynamics limit military conflict. This section of the book also develops some interesting new statistical methodologies to test the connections between democracy and commerce to peace. McDonald extends the current empirical evidence on these issues (which are largely based on twentieth century data) back to the nineteenth century era of globalization which ended in 1914. These statistical tests are then run against three controversial case studies; namely:

a. the struggles between the UK and the US over trade, tariffs, and imperial aspiration in the 19th century and how these developed into amicable rather than hostile relations;
b. the economic origins of the First World War; and
c. the evolution of the conflict between China and Taiwan.

The third section then explores the relative capacity of democratic and liberal economic institutions to promote peace and argues that market-based exchange—and not democracy—has historically acted as a more significant constraint on war. The conclusion of these analyses is that the US needs to redirect more attention to promoting markets than to promoting democracy. As in Adam Smith much earlier argument, McDonald proposes that the 'invisible hand' of rational
economic decision-makers in free markets is more likely to generate sustainable development, democracy and peace than current US aid and foreign policies. McDonald does not suggest abandoning the democratization priority, but does suggest an increased focus on the peaceful consequences of the liberal agenda.

This thesis directs most attention towards the external significance of two often-overlooked domestic institutions: namely private property and competitive market structures. In doing so, it challenges the political and structural variants of Waltzian realism and Wendtian constructivism by directing attention to the ways in which economic institutions shape domestic power balances and their willingness to fight for both economic and political purposes.

However, perhaps the most interesting feature of the analysis is McDonald's deconstruction of international trade and the national domestic institutions that govern it. Doing this enables him to identify what sorts of international trade will or will not generate stable peace. By focusing on the ways in which diverse economic sectors negotiate with governments over alliances, transport, tariffs, subsidies and political barriers to trade, McDonald is able to examine whether or not these struggles are likely to promote peace. This is the most fascinating part of this very engrossing book as he is able to argue that political regimes mediate between different types of economic dynamics to maintain power before, during and after conflicts. Subsequently, it is the outcome of these types of processes that will determine whether trade and commerce will play a positive or negative role in creating the conditions for peace and act as positive spurs or incentives to maintain the peace.

As a result, The invisible hand of peace delivers some fascinating discussions about the ways in which large quantities of public property (at the disposal of governments) generate economic and political capacities for warfare. When these goods are not available to the state, there will be a greater disposition to pursue peaceful policies and for the state to raise revenues or purchase loyalty by other means. McDonald argues that where state systems have high level of fiscal autonomy and are not responsible to the producers of that wealth they are more likely to be politically irresponsible.

Kevin P Clements

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University of Otago

Killing in war


Jeff McMahan's main contention in this book is that commonsense beliefs about the morality of killing in war are deeply mistaken. In particular, he argues against the so-called 'moral equality of combatants': the claim that the combatants on both the just and unjust sides in a war have the same moral status and an equal liberty right to kill each other. His most serious argument against the equality thesis points out that the notion of making oneself liable to justified defensive attack merely by posing a threat to another has no intuitive plausibility outside the context of war. After all, police officers engaged in a gunfight with mobsters pose a threat to the mobsters, but that does not give the mobsters the liberty right to kill the policeman—instead they are supposed to surrender.

McMahan then aims his criticism at several arguments intended to show that it is permissible to fight in an unjust war provided that one abides by the ius in bello constraints. The first such argument is that in most wars 'just' soldiers are also liable to be attacked because they pose a threat not only to the unjust soldiers on the other side, but also to innocent bystanders. If this argument holds true, it would significantly lessen the practical relevance of McMahan's main contention. He tries to counter this objection by claiming that justification (which just soldiers have) defeats liability, and that this is a familiar principle in law.

However, his interpretation of the law—which does not comprise much more than half a page—is not comprehensive.
Contrary to what he suggests, justification does not always defeat tort liability outside of the context of strict liability. It is also worth mentioning that most philosophers who have thought about this issue are of the opinion that the necessity defence for inflicting damages on a third party does not defeat liability.

He also takes on the arguments that just combatants somehow voluntarily waive their right not to be killed by unjust combatants; that the epistemic situation of unjust combatants is such that they can have at least subjective justification for participation in an unjust war; that there is a duty to defer to the epistemic authority of the government; and that the alleged duty to support the efficient functioning of just institutions somehow justifies the participation in an unjust war.

He presents these arguments in a clear format and tries to make them as strong as possible before dissecting and refuting them convincingly. In a following chapter he does the same with several arguments that claim that unjust combatants are largely excused for their participation in an unjust war. In his view, most unjust combatants are only partially excused.

In the fourth chapter McMahan further clarifies the concept of liability to attack—a concept that is very important for his philosophy. He usefully distinguishes between different kinds of threats posed by persons, such as culpable threats, partially excused threats and excused threats, and tries to determine the moral status of each of these kinds of threatening persons and how they fare with regard to liability to defensive attack. McMahan is well aware that some of his positions are counter-intuitive (for example, he argues that innocent threats are not liable to defensive attack) but he is undeterred by this and tries to provide arguments for why we should jettison those intuitions. However, these arguments are not always convincing and might have further counter-intuitive implications.

In the last chapter, McMahan confronts the fact that on his account of liability to military attack civilians can, in principle, be liable to military attack. Yet he argues that the circumstances where civilians will thus be liable will hardly ever arise in practice. However, his argument relies on the doctrine of double effect: the correctness of which McMahan simply assumes without argument. It also relies on the assumption that civilians can only be liable to attack if attacking them is in all likelihood a reasonably effective means to achieve a just goal. Whether this is indeed the case depends, contrary to McMahan, heavily on context. Thus, McMahan's philosophy might be much better suited to justify 'terrorism' than he is prepared to admit.

McMahan's book is a great achievement. His writing is lucid and the book stands as the most comprehensive and sophisticated criticism to date of both the idea of 'moral equality of combatants' and that civilians and soldiers can delegate their moral responsibility for the waging of an unjust war to their government. As a result, it will prove a most valuable read for anyone interested in just war theory.

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The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one


It is impossible to review this book without referencing the credentials of its author: David Kilcullen's rise to the very summit of contemporary counterinsurgency theory and practice has been meteoric. A former Australian army officer with a doctorate in political anthropology, Kilcullen's expertise on guerrilla warfare thrust him into the coterie of advisors surrounding US General David Petraeus at the height of the Iraq insurgency, earning him a key role in implementing the 2007 US surge strategy to arrest Iraq's spiralling sectarian violence. Kilcullen would also be appointed Condoleezza Rice's
chief counterinsurgency advisor in the US State Department, guiding US policy in numerous insurgency-wracked theatres, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Thailand.

Such heady credentials mean that a Kilcullen treatise on modern insurgency is of undoubted value, not least in providing an insight into the kind of analysis valued by the upper echelons of US government. Yet by authoring a book amidst such an evidently packed personal schedule—much of it, Kilcullen admits, was written while in transit between combat theatres—it is an open question as to what kind of work would emerge. The result is a mosaic that is part strategic discourse and part travelogue. Its theoretical expositions on understanding insurgency are kept relatively brief in favour of discussion of the author's experiences with insurgency across the globe. The book is dominated by case-study chapters covering Afghanistan and Iraq in detail, followed by a medley chapter that darts between other locations under the US counterterrorism spotlight (stopping along the way to revisit the author's prior Australian army service stabilizing East Timor in 1999).

The thematic core of Kilcullen's book is the titular 'accidental guerrilla'—a reference to any disgruntled local who joins an insurgency in defence of kith and kin against occupying or invading forces. Kilcullen's concern is the manner in which local disgruntlements are exploited by the more globally oriented ideology of al-Qaeda. Case by case, he seeks to explain why and how a hornet's nest of local resistance is stirred by outside military interventions, and he does so using the lens of local societal and cultural dynamics. Tribal structures and associated attitudes and practises hold the key to decoding what he calls the 'microdetails of war zone social behaviour' (306). Herein are the indicators as to how a local populace might react to overtures to prise apart any allegiance they hold towards an insurgent movement. Local context is everything in understanding why such allegiances might arise. He relays an anecdote from Afghanistan in which a Taliban ambush of a US patrol is assisted by nearby farmers who have no link to the insurgents, but—as Kilcullen's later fieldwork suggests—arrive armed because this firefight might have been the most significant and identity-affirming event to occur in the valley for years.

A second key theme of this book is how insurgencies today differ from those of past decades. With local and international causes blended together in a single conflict, and with modern technology rubbing shoulders against age-old tribal structures as mechanisms through which conflict unfolds, today's 'hybrid wars' are a complex patchwork. For Kilcullen, Iraq typifies such a diagnosis. Its terrorism, insurgency, communal conflict—as well as its backdrop of regional inter-state rivalry—collectively constitute the confusing collage of violence that has gripped the country. Kilcullen draws out from this analysis the implications for practitioners who are charged with designing effective civil and military interventions.

The author freely admits these are not necessarily novel insights. The soldier-scholars of past conflicts have thoroughly documented the tenets of counterinsurgency strategy (one example he cites is David Galula's account of the French in Algeria). The value of Kilcullen's book resides in his articulation of these enduring principles for the modern era. As strategic discourse conveyed through a blend of analysis and anecdote, his case studies provide authoritative diagnosis of the dynamics driving current conflicts. In some cases—the Afghan chapter in particular—the highly localized snapshot he provides is insufficient to draw wider generalizations for the campaign as a whole. This is not necessarily to the detriment of the book, however, and is representative of a dilemma underlying counterinsurgency strategizing. Ultimately, so drenched in local nuance is its successful application, that providing detailed examples of counterinsurgency in practice is perhaps the most appropriate platform through which to convey its theory.

Throughout this book, Kilcullen's discourse on counterinsurgency is also something of a metaphor for how he envisages that the totality of the al-Qaeda franchise ought to be confronted. At the operational level, Kilcullen argues that it is best not to make situations worse in any one battlefield by pushing locals into the hands of insurgents; at the global level, he argues that it is best not to push otherwise-local conflicts into the overarching narrative of al-Qaeda's global cause by, for example, staging Iraq-style interventions with overt military force. In both dimensions Kilcullen's argument is persuasive, borne as it is from his academically oriented mind and his traversing of the battlefields about which he writes.
Energy dependency, politics and corruption in the former Soviet Union: Russia's power, oligarchs' profits and Ukraine's missing energy policy, 1995-2006


Balmaceda has produced an original and ambitious analysis of energy policy in Ukraine with implications for other post-Soviet States (PSSs). Her book analyses energy policy in relation to the political system of Ukraine, focusing on the numerous interdependencies between politics and energy management. A central argument is that Ukraine's 'political arrangements' influence the management of energy dependency and produce a lack of a consistent energy policy (35).

A wide range of books analyse energy policy at a state-to-state level, but there is much less written on domestic politics as an explanatory variable for energy management in PSSs. Analysis of the national politics of PSSs provides a crucial context for understanding energy-related issues. All the same, due to the informal connections, unwritten rules and murky relations that exist between state and business in PSSs, it is often difficult to make sense of the development of their domestic energy policies. Post-Soviet leaders have made seemingly paradoxical decisions and often contradictory statements.

Balmaceda's book takes on this challenge. The book is divided into three parts. The first part (chapters 2-4) analyzes the post-Soviet context of energy relations. The second (chapters 5-7) looks at the concept of energy rents and energy dependency in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship during the Kuchma presidency from 1995 to 2004. The third (chapters 8-9) focuses on energy policy and energy dependency at the beginning of the Yushchenko presidency from 2005.

Chapter 2 analyzes the role of energy in Ukraine's foreign relations with Russia, the EU and international financial institutions. Chapter 3 focuses on general aspects of the patterns of interest articulation and policy-making in Ukraine and its political system in the period 1995-2004. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the development of Ukraine's energy market and policies in the period 1991-2004 and aims to answer the question of how domestic political conditions influenced the development of Ukraine's energy markets (45).

Chapter 5 continues this topic by asking how political changes were reflected in the management of energy dependency. Chapter 6 discusses the system of energy policy-making in detail. It argues that the formal and informal national institutions in Ukraine influenced its management of energy dependency. Chapter 7 analyses 'rents of energy dependency' in Ukraine. It demonstrates how certain groups benefit from the situation of energy dependency, 'privately appropriating its “benefits” while shifting the costs to the state and society as a whole' (97). Among oligarchs and managers of energy industries there was 'a common interest in freezing real economic and energy reforms for the simple reason that it was in their interest to maintain a system that allowed them to amass vast riches' (115). This chapter maintains that the main factor ruling the political and economic changes in Ukraine has been the opportunity of access to rents.

Chapter 8 analyses the role of energy rents in the political system of Ukraine by focusing on the interplay between old and new elites in the Yushchenko period as well as on energy corruption and anti-corruption initiatives. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by analyzing how easy availability of energy-related corruption funds has influenced political and economic reforms in modern Ukraine.

One of the most interesting aspects of this study is its emphasis on the numerous interconnections and interdependencies
between Ukraine's national politics and its management of its energy sector. Indeed, Balmaceda does an excellent job in noting the various ways in which Ukraine's political system, culture of corruption, energy dependency and rents of dependency all had mutually reinforcing effects on each other (139). She does not just problematize these interconnections and interdependencies, she also provides for some policy implications. Notably, she argues that the main guarantee against corruption is a move to full market prices: "the move to more market-oriented prices may actually turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the Ukrainian economy" (143).

The book is a truly unique study, viewing Ukraine's political experience through the prism of energy policy. It is a pioneering work in the field of energy studies and regime transition. The novel theoretical framework and the massive numbers of sources analysed constitute a significant contribution to the literature on post-Soviet politics in general and energy policy in particular.

Anastassia V Obydenkova

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Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, Madrid

Descent into chaos: the United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia


After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency is stronger than ever and now threatens the stability of its nuclear-armed neighbour, Pakistan. Pledging to fulfil his campaign promise for victory in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama recently announced his decision to add 17,000 soldiers to the 35,000 already deployed. Now that the President has adopted the Afghanistan campaign as his own, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid offers a timely account of the failures of the war on terrorism in Descent into chaos. In 2000, Rashid published the definitive account of the Islamists of Central Asia in Taliban, which became essential reading for military planners, journalists, and NGO workers. Here, Rashid attempts a work of equal gravitas, scope and success.

While acknowledging the mistakes of the Clinton administration in US foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan —"long periods of inaction; whimsical plans … no clear American determination to get rid of al Qaeda or the Taliban"—Rashid reserves a bruising critique for Bush and his neoconservative advisors. The failure of the war on terrorism, Rashid argues, is primarily the failure of nation-building in Central Asia. George W. Bush was elected in 2000 on a platform of rejecting the Clinton drive for humanitarian foreign policy: 'I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building', he said. 'I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win wars'. As Rashid convincingly demonstrates, this provincial focus on the national interest would damn the interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and incubate the insurgencies prevalent today.

Rashid's indictment of the Western intervention in Afghanistan is comprehensive and persuasive. After the initial campaign ended, Bush's priority was to 'declare victory and get out', which resulted in an outsourcing of the responsibility of national security to warlords and drug barons, which made the centralization of the state apparatus under Afghan President Hamid Karzai all but impossible. Former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld vetoed a 'Marshall Plan' for Central Asia and blocked the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force outside Kabul, which might have provided the infrastructure necessary to rebuild the shattered economy, provide livelihoods, create social and political structures and introduce democracy. Without the nurturing of a genuine civil society, both Iraq and Afghanistan witnessed insurgencies after the cessation of major combat operations.

The great tragedy in all this was the squandering of the universal revulsion for the Taliban by the Afghani people. After
twelve-five years of war and repression by Islamic extremists, most Afghans initially regarded Western intervention as a way toward prosperity and peace, as demonstrated by Rashid's moving account of the 2004 presidential elections. Instead, Afghanistan has been failed by the West, whose NATO forces demurred in their responsibilities with lists of crippling 'caveats,' as well as by its own leaders, who are incapable of tackling corruption and poor governance.

Rashid is at his best on home ground, particularly while describing the double-dealing of Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf's regime after 9/11. For decades, the army and Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) have sought to undermine Pakistan's neighbours with a policy of fostering Islamic extremists to carry out a proxy war against India in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Musharraf regarded the Taliban as loyal allies in the fight for Central Asian hegemony, and he accordingly developed a 'two-track policy' of handing over al Qaeda Arabs to the United States and protecting the Taliban at home. In so doing, Pakistan became indispensable to the United States in the war against terrorism: witness the unflagging support for Musharraf by the Bush administration along with billions of dollars in military aid. However, it has also provided a safe haven for al Qaeda and the insurgency in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas, undermining the war in Afghanistan and providing terrorists with a new base of operations from which to carry out attacks against the West. Unsurprisingly, over the last eight years, the Taliban have gradually turned on their masters in the ISI, and today Pakistan verges on outright civil war.

In its unswerving faith in democracy, Descent into chaos fails to convince. Surely, the Bush administration deserves criticism for propping up an anti-democratic regime that imprisoned political opponents and fostered Islamic extremism. But there was never much alternative: the previous democratically elected prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, ran notoriously corrupt and unproductive administrations. Rashid argues that Pakistan can solve its crisis only by reigning in the military and encouraging a democratic system of governance. This is perhaps true in the long run, but political events are pushing Pakistan toward chaos; in this situation, it is unlikely that democracy will engender greater stability.

The war left behind by the Bush administration now threatens to engulf all of Central Asia, which could carry grave consequences for Western security. So long as the Taliban insurgency is allowed to fester, Pakistan and Afghanistan will continue to unravel.

Benjamin Bright

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UniversityofCambridge

Hot, flat and crowded: why the world needs a green revolution-and how we can renew our global future


In Hot, flat and crowded, Thomas L Friedman presents a compelling and provocative account of the challenges and opportunities facing humanity as the converging pressures of global warming, a widening middle class and rapid population growth begin to characterize the twenty-first century. Together these pressures could make the planet 'dangerously unstable' (5): '[L]ike the proverbial frog in the pail on the stove' (48), human society has not completely grasped the scale of the problem, let alone developed a long-term survival plan.

Friedman begins with the challenges that he sees manifested in five global phenomena: depleting energy and natural resource supplies, accelerated climate change, wealth transfers to petrodictatorships, large-scale loss of biodiversity and deepening energy poverty. His short but lucid description of each portrays the well exposed interdependencies that have dominated environmental rhetoric since the 1992 UN Summit on Environment and Development. Friedman claims that these problems 'reached a critical mass sometime shortly after the year 2000' (48) and that we are now in a new historical
epoch that Friedman terms in his mnemonic style the 'Energy-Climate Era' (26).

But it is not all doom and gloom. Indeed, 'the future does not have to be a Malthusian nightmare' (49). As a self-proclaimed 'sober-optimist' (411), Friedman posits that the challenge of a 'hot, flat and crowded' world could very well be seen as an opportunity. In fact, it is this perspective that differentiates Friedman's thesis from the wealth of environmental literature that all too often focuses on the problem and not the solution.

The future will be defined by those who embrace the opportunities of a green economy. Friedman notes that 'green is going from boutique to better, from a choice to a necessity, from a fad to a strategy to win, from an insoluble problem to a great opportunity' (172). Friedman terms this strategy 'Code Green' (6), and at centre-stage is America. He argues that the only way America will remain a superpower is 'if it is big in big things' (181) of which the biggest undertaking is the production of clean power, energy efficiency and protection of biodiversity.

His rationale for an American Code Green strategy is threefold: first-mover advantage in renewable technologies will provide large economic benefits as clean power systems move down the learning curve and begin to scale, reduced dependency on foreign nations for fuel will improve energy security, and most evocative, a status quo in a fossil-fuel economy will undermine the quality of life for every person on the planet. For Friedman America's role as the leader in developing and deploying a 'Clean Energy System' (171) is paramount. It is the key to refocusing America's position as the forerunner in innovating better technologies as well as providing a sustainable solution for the world's troubles—'we solve our problems by helping the world solve its problems' (173).

To demonstrate his raison d'être, Friedman dedicates the second half of the book to how America can meet the challenges of a Code Green strategy. He has no illusions about the scale of the problem, and compares it to scaling the summit of Mount Everest. Often misconstrued as something easy, a truly green revolution will be disruptive and lead to a profound transformational shift in how we produce and consume energy. Friedman argues that what we need is a combination of integrated government policies—laws, standards, tax incentives, mandates and targets—that will guide and stimulate investment in clean energy along with an advanced energy information technology system, known as the 'Energy Internet' (217) which will enable us 'to do extraordinary things by way of saving energy and using clean power efficiently' (218).

For a proponent of globalization and free market forces, the leftward movement towards government-led intervention seems slightly contradictory. But Friedman is quick to point out that only the free market supplemented with the right 'incentives and disincentives' (244) can bring radical improvement and innovation on this scale. Poignantly Friedman notes that 'we are not going to regulate our way out of the Energy-Climate Era' (243), we are only going to innovate our way out, and the most effective way is the US marketplace.

Of course the task that Friedman sets himself in providing solutions to the world's energy and environmental woes is nothing short of mammoth. He covers good ground—from the political energy lobby in Washington to China's role in the planet's sustainable future; from equatorial forest conservation in Indonesia to smart meters in every home in America. Some interesting examples are used to illustrate his points, but understandably many blind spots occur, such as the feasibility constraints for large-scale renewable technology roll-out and the equity stake of developing countries in the climate change debate. Moreover, the American-centric discourse at times distracts from the global relevance of the challenges posed in the book. Yet undeniably, America's role in taking unilateral leadership in the energy-climate debate will ultimately form the basis for multilateral cooperation. *Hot, flat and crowded* should thus be considered a common sense book that places the right economic emphasis on our energy future.

Mark Whitman

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The case for big government


Jeff Madrick is a distinguished author and former columnist for the New York Times, best known for his columns and books during the late 1980s and early 1990s which chronicled the phenomenon of downward social mobility. In The case for big government, Madrick implores his fellow citizens to remove the ideological blinkers from their eyes and discover, once and for all, that the 'big state' is not the enemy of the American people, but rather its greatest ally: the last defence standing between the middle class and a return to Gilded Age plutocracy. The book is aimed at Republicans and Democrats alike, for Madrick believes that his fellow Democrats have bought into the myth that the best government is the smallest government. Anchored firmly in OECD statistics, economic history and the work of mainstream economists such as Peter Lindert, this is a highly readable work of synthesis. It is one part historical analysis, one part prescription for change. Madrick's key goal is to harness the powers of the state in the name of reviving the 'American dream'. The price of this goal, according to Madrick (writing in 2007-08), would be an increase in overall US government spending from thirty per cent GDP to thirty-five per cent. A revived wealth tax, increased capital gains taxes, and other measures designed to reverse the trend toward wealth concentration could be used to increase spending on the vast majority of citizens, to the betterment of all, and with no harm to the growth rate.

The case for big government went to press just as Wall Street started to meltdown in the autumn of 2008, and the new economic conditions of 2009 may render the book’s key prescriptions difficult to implement. Thirteen years after Bill Clinton declared that 'the era of big government is over' the US federal deficit makes Reagan's overspending look mild by comparison. The state has virtually nationalized the financial sector and a good portion of the auto industry as well. Madrick's call to boost government spending from roughly thirty per cent of GDP to thirty-five per cent has already been heard and realized, only the new monies are being devoted to bail-outs designed to mop up the excesses and failures associated with rampant deregulation. In light of this, it is difficult to see how the US public or lawmakers will find the stomach for the type of domestic infrastructure and social spending increases called for in this book.

Madrick cannot of course be faulted for failing to see this coming. In fact, there is little to criticize in this well written, persuasively argued book. The reader is walked through US economic history with the help of Madrick's fluid prose, free of academic jargon. We see that the periods of greatest prosperity in recent US history coincide with the greatest bursts of economic growth. Madrick does not suggest that the rise of state spending caused greater economic growth (as many European socialists like to argue). Rather, he argues, in his typically pragmatic fashion, that the US economy can absorb higher taxes and greater spending without hindering future growth. The key problem, as he sees it, is that Americans have lost their trust in government. Without trust in government, proposals for higher spending will go nowhere. The book is designed to reassure readers that the US government has a long history of subsidizing worthwhile things such as public universities, advanced research, health care, food and drug safety and public health programmes. All of this is well known but Madrick has a flair for choosing the best possible example to make his case. Some people will read this fascinating and concise book in one sitting.

Perhaps the most original section of the book identifies the 1970s as a key turning point in US history. It was during the 1970s that the American Right, led by Milton Friedman, chose to blame 'big government' (the 'rapid' growth of the 'money supply') for the evils of stagflation (stagnant economic growth plus inflation). Madrick dismisses this argument for the hogwash it is. The causes of stagflation were far more complex than government spending—which was, in any case, not very high in 1970s America. Nevertheless, it was 35 years ago that the master narrative of the 1980s to the Obama administration was created: all tax increases are bad, government is the problem not the solution, the big state is bad for economic growth. Americans told themselves the Big Lie and they told it often. Madrick reminds us that economists such as Lindert and William Easterly (no Democrat) have shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that there is no link between tax/spending levels and economic performance. What matters is how wisely government spends. What matters is the type of regulation, not regulation per se. Madrick's book, then, is a call for a more nuanced discussion of taxes and spending.
Which is why I have my doubts about its impact. This is all very pragmatic and it will not surprise too many Europeans or Canadians. Alas, America is different and seemingly incapable of rational discussion when tax increases are being contemplated. One hopes that this fine book will find an audience but the recent history of the US suggests that it will be an uphill battle.

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The Responsibility to Protect captures a simple and powerful idea. The primary responsibility for protecting its own people from mass atrocity crimes lies with the state itself. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill. But when a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert such crimes, the wider international community then has a collective responsibility to take whatever action is necessary. R2P emphasizes preventive action above all. That includes assistance for states struggling to contain potential crises and for effective rebuilding after a crisis or conflict to In This Review. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. How should the international community act in the face of genocide and humanitarian atrocities? Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, is one of the leading intellectual forces behind the doctrine of "the responsibility to protect," a landmark effort to redefine the norms of sovereignty and interventionism, endorsed by the UN World Summit of 2005. This book provides a grand statement of the idea and describes the troubled world setting in which it emerged and its far-ranging implications. The innovation of the doctrine was to shift the debate from the international community. Keywords: Responsibility to Protect. Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation. Chesterman, Simon. Book Review: The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, by Gareth Evans (October 5, 2009). Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29 (2009), 541â€“543. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482949. International, Transnational & Comparative Criminal Law eJournal. Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic. FOLLOWERS. 270.