Patronage in Israel and the Americanization of Politics

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Introduction

Recently, there has been growing interest in and discussion of political corruption in Israel. In this context, political appointments are regarded by the State Comptroller, the Attorney General and many others as though they were the quintessence of evil. In 2004 the State Comptroller published an unprecedentedly severe report condemning political appointments made by then Minister of Environment Tzachi Hanegbi, and for the first time in Israel, the Attorney General is about to charge a Minister with a criminal offence, only because he made political appointments.¹

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the phenomenon of patronage in Israel, and to use the Hanegbi affair as an example of its development and its future. The question that guided the research on which this paper is based is whether the massive use of patronage in the Hanegbi’s case is related to changes in the character of parties in general (Mair 1997, 2005; Daalder 2002). My thesis is that what most affects the range and character of patronage is the Americanization of the political arena, which, in turn, changes the character of political parties. I will argue that on one hand, this global process causes intensification of intra-party conflicts, which lead to institutional reforms a-la America. Basically these reforms weaken democracy within and outside the parties, and strengthen the use of patronage. On the other hand, Americanization enhances institutional actors and liberal discourse which constrain patronage. Thus, the phenomenon is not steady and its development is dialectical.

¹ Attorney General Mazuz has decided in principle to indict Hanegbi because of political appointments, but Hanegbi is still entitled to a hearing at which he can try to persuade Mazuz to change his mind. The hearing is expected to take place in June 2006.
This paper continues as follows: The first part presents the analytical framework, using a neo-institutional perspective and a relational view of political actors. While this perspective explains outcomes of political struggles and political phenomena (like political patronage) through institutional settings, it also questions why and how institutional change occurs. Furthermore, because institutions are not hermetic and, to a certain degree, are open to interpretation, the analysis leaves room for agents’ choices. Part 2 presents the methodology and some terminological clarifications. It also presents, in brief, epistemological problems with which any study of patronage has to deal, and explains how this paper is going to handle them. Part 3 is a description of the political system in Israel. In order to remain within the limits of time and space, this section will concentrate only on structural and constitutional elements (like the type of regime and the electoral system). The fourth part of the paper describes and analyzes the dialectic development of patronage in Israel and the Hanegbi affair. In the conclusion, I summarize the research and provide a normative evaluation of patronage in Israel and a preliminary assessment of its future.

1. The analytical framework

The analytical framework for this study is a combination of several theoretical elements: a neo-institutional analysis and a historical and relational view of political interactions. Like many other scholars in the field of comparative politics, I accept the claim that institutional variables are important. However, the approach adopted here presumes that institutional factors should not be considered the only determinants.

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2 As Scott Mainwaring put it, institutional design has an impact that is not reducible to the result of a particular configuration of social forces (Mainwaring 1999, 7-8, 283).
First, political systems comprise several institutional orders whose contradictions allow political actors to redefine institutional settings (Shafir and Peled 2002). Specifically, patronage runs counter to some democratic principles and legal arrangements. This tension makes the use of patronage not automatic. Second, like any other phenomenon in politics, institutions are not hermetic, and the ways that they fulfill their functions are open to interpretation. At times, actors will suggest a new interpretation, and choose a new strategy that may be beneficial (see also Piattoni 2001: 18).

This paper views the political arena as a terrain inhabited by multiple actors, who all seek to advance what they believe to be their interests, while interacting with other actors, who are basically trying to achieve the same goal. It is a bit of a paradox, but as far as I can discern, politicians’ possibilities are quite limited. This claim leads to another aspect of the theoretical framework: the multiplicity of spheres that shape the actors’ strategies and political behavior. These are the global context, the political system, the inter-party level, and the intra-party level.

The first sphere, or dimension, is the global one. Here, as a matter of convenience, we should look for the most important phenomenon, if there is one (otherwise, we may get lost in the details). It seems that in the global sphere, the phenomenon most important today for party politics is the Americanization of political life. This refers to the domination of economic considerations over political ones, the privatization of state services, the abolition of the state apparatus and authorities, the “presidentialization” of politics,3 the lack of interest and distrust by the

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3 The “presidentialization of politics” is a new term that describes an ongoing process in which political systems are coming to operate according to presidential logic, irrespective of their formal constitutional structure. The logic of presidentialization is revealed in the growing power of
majority of citizens in political parties, and the fact that candidates, political parties and the mass media take their cue from their counterparts in the United States (including running expensive election campaigns). Another prominent aspect of Americanization is the adoption of new intra-party candidate selection methods that widen participation in the selection process and change intra-party relations.

The level of the political system includes the kind of regime, the specific model of democracy, the current political discourse (does it emphasize republican values, liberal ones, ethno-centric values or perhaps a combination?), and the institutional interests of political actors outside the parties, including the enforcement system and the administration, that determine, or affect and influence, the supply and demand for patronage. Following Martin Shefter (1994), on the supply side I emphasize the relations of parties vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, including administrative arrangements and institutional safeguards that are supposed to prevent illegal political appointments (Shefter 1994). Here, the Civil Service Commissioner, the State Comptroller and the Attorney General are important actors. On the demand side, we should take into

political leaders within political executives and political parties, and in the emergence of increasingly leadership-centered electoral processes (including “democratizing” the party leadership selection, as explored by LeDuc, 2001). On the “presidentialization of politics”, see Poguntke and Webb, 2005.

4 See, for example, Mair, 2005; Transparency International, 2005; Dalton, 2006.

5 I took this characterization from Mancini and Swanson, 1996, 4.


7 For the meaning of supply and demand in the context of patronage, see Piattoni, 2001: 16-17.

8 This is in contrast to Shefter. As Apostolis Papakostas emphasizes, the working of institutional gatekeepers and political institutions in general is contingent upon broad social processes, including the demand for patronage (Papakostas 2001, 51).
account actors like workers’ unions in government companies and certain religious or other groups which, because of their solidarity, can effectively put their political power up for sale. Also, we should bear in mind socio-economic cleavages and the tolerance of the public for specific groups who enjoy patronage politics.

The inter-party sphere has four components: the structure of the party system, relations between the government and the majority and opposition parties, the options and constraints of each party as a function of other parties’ decisions, and finally, the character of the political system as a whole (for example, is it a cartel system, in which parties cooperate?).

The next dimension is the intra-party sphere. On the intra-party level, politicians attempt to enhance or protect their status in the party’s hierarchy (and their image in the public eye) through strategic decisions (see also Barnea and Rahat, forthcoming). The strategies and behavior of intra-party actors can best be described as the outcome of the calculation of their interests as team players with their own self-interest, as individual players struggling to retain or improve their position within the party and in the political arena. One of the most important factors in this context is the candidate selection method, which carries great weight in the relationship between politicians

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9 For example, if one party adapts primaries as a candidate selection method, and this is perceived by the public as more democratic, its major rivals may also adopt primaries, in order not to be perceived as oligarchic, and lose popularity. This process probably occurred in Israel (Hofnung 2005, 65), as will be elaborated below.

10 Here the term cartel refers to relations between parties. The term can also be used to describe the relations between the parties and the state, but this I view rather as part of the political system level – the model of democracy – and not as part of the inter-party level. For meanings of the term “cartel party,” see Katz and Mair 1996.
and their parties. Candidate selection methods determine what strategies politicians should adopt in order to retain or improve their political status within their parties.\footnote{On the importance of partisan selection methods for intra-partisan life, see Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999; Rahat 2002; Wu 2001; Hazan 2002; Barnea and Rahat forthcoming.}

These spheres all need to be taken into account when attempting to depict any political behavior; each has a role in explaining patronage by political parties today. Moreover, the spheres can be viewed as a funnel – beginning with the most abstract dimension, which structures the basic strategies, to the most concrete one, which determines each actor’s actual options. Finally, we need to keep in mind that the political dynamics and strategies that each politician can adopt are also a product of past experiences and interpretations. How these dynamics work is another crucial question that I shall leave open for the time being.

2. Terminology, Definitions, Epistemology and Methodology

In this paper, patronage is operationalized as political appointments. I define a political appointment as the appointment or nomination of a person to a public position,\footnote{A public position is a position that is financed by the public treasury (including, for example, a position in a government company which is not part of the civil service), or a position that is defined by the country’s laws as a public position.} or the creation of public position, in which the politician who made the appointment or had the ministerial responsibility for it, inserts personal (including political) considerations regarding the identity of the individual appointed or nominated that are deemed irrelevant for the post or for doing the job well.

Clearly in evaluating appointments, the motivational or subjective aspect of the politician is crucial, which leads to a theoretical-normative dilemma and to an epistemological and methodological quandary. Concerning the former, how should
we treat a nomination that has mixed motives? Moreover, how should we deal with the fact that, to a certain degree (that has never been defined), self-interest considerations of a politician are considered legitimate in democratic politics?\(^{13}\) I suggest that although the presence of these features is a matter of degree, the distinction between political appointments and other types of appointments should be treated as dichotomous. The critical test here is whether the politician had the intention to gain personal profit (political, financial or other), which is considered illegitimate in the political system, and if so, did this have any affect on his decision on whom to nominate. If he did consider a matter regarded as illegitimate, and the consideration affected his decision, the appointment was political, whether or not the person he appointed was the best person for the job (from a bureaucratic point of view, for example). Similarly, if the only reasons for the appointment were appropriacy to the task, or if other considerations had no affect on the decision, then the appointment is not a political one, no matter how ill-suited the appointee is. On the other hand, there is a dimension of a continuum in the concept of political appointments. The more weight the politician confers on personal or political considerations, in a context in which they are regarded as out of place, the more suitable the term “political” is to describe it. To sum up this conceptual issue, I would like to paraphrase Sartori’s argument regarding democracy: what makes a nomination or an appointment political should not be mixed up with what makes it more or less political.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) For the legitimacy of political and self-interest considerations in democracy and its application in the normative evaluation of a related phenomenon – corruption, see Thompson 1993.

\(^{14}\) Sartori’s original claim is that “what makes democracy possible should not be mixed up with what makes democracy more democratic” (cited in Collier and Adcock 1999, 548).
Emphasizing and weighing the state of mind of the politician in political appointments raise epistemological and methodological problems. How can we know what led a politician to act as he did? On rare occasions, one finds clear evidence in the form of the politician’s declaration of his political motivation.\textsuperscript{15} But probably in the majority of cases, the answer to why the politician decided to appoint ‘X’ and not ‘Y’ is far from straightforward. There are two, only partial, solutions to this problem. The first is the identity of the appointee in relation to the characteristics of the politician. If the appointee is a member of the Minister’s caucus or a member of the electing body of the list of candidates for parliament, for example, and has no extraordinary skills, the appointed is presumed to be political. The second indicator is what actions were taken by the politician prior to the appointment, in relation to legal constrictions or other considerations. If, for example, he was involved in appointing junior positions in his Ministry, even though such positions are not related to his daily duties, we presume that the appointment is a political one. These indicators will determine our judgment as to whether or not a certain appointment was a political one, even when the truth is that the politician’s motives were completely pure; e.g., to appoint the best person for the job, for the benefit of all.

The empirical materials and findings in this papers are based on two sources of data: (1) Personal, in-depth interviews conducted by the author with three retired Civil Service Commissioners, with a current Member of Parliament who is a senior member of the Labor party, with the legal adviser of the State Comptroller’s office,

\textsuperscript{15} Following an Israeli Minister’s admission that he nominated people to a local council because of their association with his party, the high court admonished the Minister and declared the nomination invalid (Barak-Erez 2002, 623).
and with a retired high-ranking civil servant in the Finance Ministry;\textsuperscript{16} (2) Reports by the State Comptroller that deal with political appointments (published in 1989, 2001, 2004 and 2005).

\textbf{3. Israeli political system – general background}

Israel is a parliamentary democracy; its electoral system is representative and proportional. The entire country constitutes one voting zone. The parliament (Knesset) is composed of 120 members (MKs), each of whom has to be a member of a political party. In national elections, voters cast their vote for a party, not for a candidate. The proportional representation system gives each party a share of the 120 seats in proportion to the number of votes it gained. The threshold for winning a seat in the parliament was recently raised from 1\% to 2\% of the total number of valid votes. A coalition government needs a vote of confidence from at least 61 MKs.

Since the first Knesset elections 1949, and up to the latest elections for the 17\textsuperscript{th} Knesset, no party has ever obtained an absolute majority of seats (e.g., at least 61). Because of the electoral system and voter behavior, the Knesset has always been composed of a multitude of parties. This requires the largest party in the Knesset to enter into a bargaining process of coalition formation. The electoral system has been a political bone of contention since the early days of the state. There were those who opposed broad coalitions, claiming that they prevent the leading party from governing effectively. The advocates of the system argue that the system provides an accurate reflection of the spectrum of Israeli society and its range of opinions (Hermann 1995).

\textsuperscript{16} The interviews were held in 2006.
4. Patronage and the changing of the political system in Israel

On February 2006, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz determined that Tzachi Hanegbi, Minister without Portfolio and one of Israel’s prominent politicians, could not be appointed to a Ministry following the elections to the 17th Knesset, which took place on 28 March 2006. The decision stemmed from an investigation opened in September 2004 on the basis of the State Comptroller’s findings that as Environment Minister, Hanegbi had made dozens of political appointments in the Ministry, including some to fictitious jobs, between January 2001 and March 2003 (State Comptroller 2004). Most of the appointments went to Likud Central Committee members or their relatives, since Hanegbi was then an MK representing the Likud party. The report described scores of political appointments, some initiated by Hanegbi and others at the behest of the then Director General of the Environment Ministry. The State Comptroller accused the Ministry’s professional staff, and in particular the Deputy Director General for Administration, of doing nothing to block the flood of appointments.

The Comptroller’s report listed the methods that Hanegbi and his associates used to award positions to Likud Central Committee members and their relatives. These included appointing relatives as acting officials (a temporary solution to “urgent needs”), to give them an advantage in the tender that is published in order to make the appointment legal and official; appointing relatives as expert advisors, even when the relatives were not suitable for the job, without looking for better appointees; presenting single candidates for junior positions exempt from tenders, and appointing Central Committee members to state service positions via private “manpower” companies, even when the Minister or his staff are not suppose to be involved in the appointments. It is important to note that administrative law forbids any involvement...
of the Minister or his personal staff in appointments to junior or mid-rank positions, whether or not they are exempt from tender obligations; giving associates preference in external tenders by putting pressure on the tender committee; or increasing the number of jobs in the Minister’s and Director General’s office.

After the 2003 intra-party vote, Hanegbi was elected the highest-placed candidate on the Likud candidate list to the Knesset (behind the guaranteed spots for Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu). The number of political appointments in proportion to the size of the Ministry,\(^{17}\) and the publicity that the affair received, make the case worthy of in-depth analysis.\(^{18}\)

Why did Hanegbi decide to use massive political appointments? What safeguards were supposed to prevent such appointments? Why did the State Comptroller decide to publish such a harsh report?

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In Israel’s first decade (1948-1958), patronage in bureaucracy was commonplace. But in 1959 the Knesset passed the State Service (Appointments) Law, which forbade political appointments. The law stipulated that recruitment to the civil service would be through tenders “except in those cases laid down by law.” The legislation was based on the assumption that tenders are the best method to recruit and promote

\(^{17}\) The number of the office staff is about 200. According to estimations Hanegbi appointed around 80 people from his party (the State Comptroller, who decided to concentrate only on clearly political cases, mentions only 34 appointments).

\(^{18}\) Since the Hanegbi case, two other prominent cases have been exposed. One was revealed in the State Comptroller’s 2005 annual report, this time in the Agriculture Ministry, headed by Likud member, Israel Katz. The other case was probably the most illuminating. Less than a month before the national elections to the 17th Knesset, an investigative report broadcast on Channel 10 television quoted excerpts from Omri Sharon’s diary, which detailed how Omri arranged appointments and the names of those involved.
people in the civil service, and that any other method of recruitment would not ensure selection of the most able individuals and would be susceptible to abuse. From the 1960s until the early 1980s, the quantity of political appointments decreased dramatically. It was no longer necessary to be a member of the ruling party, or a member of one of the coalition parties, to be appointed to the civil service. Moreover, after the historical victory of Likud over Mapai in the elections to the 9th Knesset in May 1977, the new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, announced that his government would not replace the public servants with Likud members. In his first years in office, Begin kept his promise (Nachmias 1991).¹⁹

The re-politicization of the civil service began in the early 1980s and increased throughout the decade.²⁰ There are several possible, and complementary, reasons for this. First, in the early 80s, there were clear signs that the bureaucratic elite was not implementing the Likud government’s policy, providing justification for change. The second reason was mounting pressure by rank-and-file party members for reallocation of public positions throughout the public sector. These members did not accept Begin’s attitude to the civil service. The third reason was that in 1983 Begin resigned.

¹⁹ Rami Friedman, who was State Service Commissioner between 1977 and 1980, confirmed in an interview that there were very few attempts, in certain offices only, to make political appointments.

²⁰ This claim is only an estimate of the author, but I hope that it is more than a mere guess. It is based on an interview with former State Service Commissioner, Prof. Itzhak Galnoor, who is also an expert in public administration, and has partial data on the subject (Galnoor told me that an empirical study was never completed, due to the death of its author, but Galnoor had read an early draft). An indirect indication of the possibility that more political appointments were made in the 80s is the fact that in April 1989, for the first time, the State Comptroller published an annual report (concerning the year 1988) that dealt with the issue of recent political appointments (see State Comptroller 1989, 627-642) and these reports continued in later years. But the assumption is also based on the theoretical rationale of this paper, which means that it may represent a self-fulfilling prophecy.
From then on, the Likud suffered from constant internal conflicts and became a factionalized party, in which loyalty to a faction and to its leader took precedence over loyalty to the party, its chosen leader or ideology (Doron and Goldberg 1990). In other words, in order to be elected to the party’s candidate list to parliament, politicians now had to provide Central Committee members with good reasons to support them. As the number of voters for the candidate list was 1,500, some party members, like the Minister of Welfare and Labor, Moshe Katzav, found that the best strategy for them to adopt in order to be elected was to supply public jobs to these voters.\(^{21}\) The strategy worked: Katzav was among the most popular politicians in the party.

The forth reason for the growth in political appointments is related to the draw between the two leading parties in the elections to the 11\(^{\text{th}}\) Knesset, in 1984. Because neither Labor nor the Likud gained sufficient votes to form a relatively stable governing coalition, and each could veto a coalition formed by the other, a broad coalition was formed that included both parties, and opposition to the government was very weak. This is an ideal situation for political appointments.\(^{22}\)

The appointments were made without legal resistance, mainly because the State Service Commissioner in the mid-1980s, Avraham Natan, was a member of the Likud party and viewed it as his duty to pinpoint vacant jobs in order to fill them with party members to public positions, some by breaking the law (the report does not mention his name, only his title: Minister of Welfare and Labor). Meir Gabai, who was State Service Commissioner (1988-1993), confirmed that Katzav was one of the champions of political appointments. He told me that one of the most crucial struggles against political appointments was with him. Today Katzav is President of Israel.

\(^{21}\) The State Comptroller’s (1989) annual report detailed 15 cases in which Katzav appointed party members to public positions, some by breaking the law (the report does not mention his name, only his title: Minister of Welfare and Labor). Meir Gabai, who was State Service Commissioner (1988-1993), confirmed that Katzav was one of the champions of political appointments. He told me that one of the most crucial struggles against political appointments was with him. Today Katzav is President of Israel.

\(^{22}\) This observation was made by Itzhak Galnoor, State Service Commissioner between 1993 and 1996.
members. Furthermore, because of the broad coalition, there was no effective opposition that could protest the appointments. However, for the first time in the history of the office, the State Comptroller audited the issue, and his conclusions appeared in his 39th Annual Report, published in 1989. Whether or not there was, in fact, an increase in the number of political appointments, this increase was not the only cause for the change in the Comptroller’s policy. The other reason, I believe, was the liberalization of political and economic life (Shafir and Peled 2002), which stood in contradiction to patronage, and enhanced support for values like ‘clean politics’, ‘fair play’ and ‘integrity and honesty in politics’.

Things once again changed by the end of the 1980s and affected the amount and character of patronage. The 1988 general elections in Israel resulted in another hung Knesset. After lengthy and tedious negotiations, the Likud, which had won the largest number of seats, formed a coalition with Labor, her traditional competitor and the second largest party in Israel. But the coalition was short-lived. In March 1990, after a few months of secret negotiations between Labor and the two religious parties (Shas and Yahadut Hatora), the Knesset passed a no-confidence motion, with Labor voting in favor and in the absence of five of the six Shas MKs, who were also partners in the coalition. The government was forced to resign and an ugly bargaining process took place between the leading parties and the minor parties, specifically the religious parties, which went on for three months after the government was brought down.

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23 One retired State Service Commissioner, who did not have a deputy in his time, told me that he met Natan when he was deputy to the State Service Commissioner, and asked him how he functioned in his position. Natan told him about his partisan perspective. Long after he left the State Service, Natan was appointed chairman of the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA). Yosef Barel, another chairman of the IBA, was known for his political appointments. Though the Minister responsible wanted to dismiss Barel, Natan and other members of the IBA, who were also party members, did not approve the decision (Caspi 2004).
After efforts by the Labor leader, Shimon Peres, to form a government failed, Likud leader Shamir formed a narrow coalition in June 1990.

In an era of liberalization, the political maneuvering of those three months led to general distrust in the parliamentary system and accusations like “we despise corrupt politicians!” (Hermann 1995). The public outcry led to the adoption of primaries in the parties and the legislation of direct elections of the Prime Minister together with the elections to parliament. The final shape of the institutional changes is not self-evident, and in order to understand these related developments, we should bear in mind the Americanization of politics that was quite intensive during those years (Shafir and Peled 2002). However, whether or not we accept the historical explanation, as will be indicated in what follows, in the long run both changes harmed the political parties, and indirectly changed the range and character of political appointments.

The first change took place in the Labor party, which had suffered the most because of the events of March-June 1990. The crisis left the MKs stripped of power, and with a justified feeling of failure and humiliation. This led to a coalition among several leading Labor politicians to replace chairman Shimon Peres, and to turn to Itzhak Rabin. Since Peres enjoyed wide support in the Central Committee which appointed the party chairman and its candidate for Prime Minister, Rabin’s supporters appealed to a larger body of voters – all the party members. In this selectorate,24 Rabin was much more popular, and they had a chance to defeat Peres. It is worth mentioning that the inspiration for the method was America (Doron and Kay 1995).

The intra-party reform in the candidate selection method was made possible in 1991, 24 The selectorate is the partisan body that elects or nominates the party’s candidate list for parliament.
due to the fact that the Likud enjoyed positive ratings in public opinion, and Labor members were afraid that they would be defeated in the 1992 national elections. Primaries for the party’s candidate for chairman and Prime Minister were held in two stages in February 1992, first for chairman, which Rabin won, and then for the party’s candidate list (Doron and Kay 1995).25 The adoption of primaries as the candidate selection method, without using corrective mechanisms to avoid takeovers of the party (like minimal length of membership), harmed the parties that adopted them. The method encouraged massive enrollment of members who were not party supporters and prominent and influential party activists recruited votes for individual candidates rather than acting on behalf of the party (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999).

Under Rabin’s government (1992-1995), there was a decrease in political appointments to the bureaucratic elite, but an increase in patronage and nepotism on the lower levels of statutory authorities and governmental companies. On one hand, the government initiated a correction to the Government Companies Law of 1975, which places restraints on political appointments to Directors of government companies. There are some indications that the legislation helped to constrain the phenomenon, even if it did not stop it completely (Barak-Erez 2002). In addition, patronage was no longer as effective a device to gain political support in the party as it had been when the selectorate was the Central Committee. Moreover, in 1993 the government appointed a professional State Service Commissioner, Itzhak Galnoor, who did not cooperate with Ministers’ efforts to appoint relatives and party members

25 It is not clear to what extent the adoption of primaries in 1992 helped Labor to win the elections to the 12th Knesset in June 1992, but one thing is certain: it gave the supporters of primaries in the Likud, the defeated party, a good excuse to adopt such a system in 1993 (Hofnung 2005).
to the civil service. All these changes, I should emphasize, were well-suited to the general tendency to legalizing and liberalizing economic and political life.

On the other hand, even under the Americanization of politics and even under primaries, patronage is useful when it is available to certain actors. To be more specific, the workers’ unions in large government companies like the Electric Company and the military industries attract politicians who want to be elected in party primaries, because they can recruit thousands of workers at once (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999). In order to gain support from the unions, it is not wise for the Minister responsible for the companies,\(^{26}\) to prevent the union from appointing family members to the companies even if this is illegal, lowers the quality of the companies and undermines the principle of equality.\(^{27}\) It is worth noting that unlike the civil service, these companies are not under the supervision of the State Service Commissioner; it is much easier to use them and statutory authorities that fulfill similar functions for partisan needs, including patronage.

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As briefly mentioned above, the political crisis of March-June 1990 also pushed the Knesset to pass a new version of the Basic Law: The Government, which introduced the system of direct election of the Prime Minister (Doron and Kay 1995; Hermann, 1995). According to the new law, which was passed in March 1992 and would be applied in the May 1996 elections, the Prime Minister was elected using a

\(^{26}\) By law, each company has a specific Minister who is responsible for it.

\(^{27}\) In 2005, the State Comptroller provided the Knesset with data on nepotism in the Airport Authority and the Electric Company. More than 10% of the employees have relatives in the companies.
winner-take-all system, while the Knesset was elected as in the past, using a strict proportional representation list system.\(^{28}\)

The constitutional changes made the political system following the elections of 1996 even more unstable and fragmented (Nachmias and Sened 1999).\(^{29}\) Furthermore, the new law intensified intra-party conflict. First, because of the direct election of the Prime Minister, the parties sought leaders with media appeal and not necessarily the traditional capabilities and experience. This harmed senior party leaders and strengthened new ones, who did not necessarily have political skills needed to lead a party. Second, in a split-ticket system, the power of the major parties decreased, and that of the minor parties increased.\(^{30}\) When the large parties are weak, the party leader who builds the coalition has to allocate more payoffs to minor parties, to the detriment of members of his own party. Moreover, the party candidate thinks that his victory stems from his popularity among the public, and that the party is not an important factor in his success. Under such circumstances, the clash between the party and its leader is practically unavoidable (Nachmias and Navot 2002).

In November 1997, intensification in the conflict between party Chairman and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Likud Ministers and MKs, caused the Likud to decide to return the candidate selection method to its Central Committee, a body with 2,500 members. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s associates were those who supported the institutional change in order to weaken the opposition within the party. The

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\(^{28}\) Two years later, in 2001, only days after the special elections for Prime Minister only, the law was revoked, and once again Israel became a strict representative parliamentary system.

\(^{29}\) The legislation was applied for the first time in 1996, and was applied fully only once more, in 1999. In 2001, elections were held only for Prime Minister. For elaboration of the law and its negative effects, see Arian and Shamir 1999, 2002.

\(^{30}\) For elaboration on this result, see Nachmias and Sened 1999.
assumption was that Netanyahu would have more control over Ministers and MKs (who had been elected in primaries and were less popular in the Central Committee) if their future were in the hands of a body dominated by Netanyahu supporters (Rahat 2002).

Under the circumstances of the period, the adoption of the new candidate selection method had dramatic effects on the use of patronage. While with primaries, where the selectorate can number up to 300,000 and massive patronage cannot ensure election to the candidate list to parliament, in a body of 2,500, patronage is the best strategy for ordinary politicians. Moreover, in the mid-1990s, unlike earlier periods, the party was much more divided as a result of the direct elections for Prime Minister, and enmity among the candidates was much fiercer. Thus, patronage had to be relatively crude so that the politician could benefit from providing it. If we add to these institutional changes the fact that in the Likud, registered party members (with no controls in the party constitution on their seniority) elected the Central Committee, we have a party that is open to individuals who don’t even vote for the party, but, for the sake of private profit, vote for their favorite Committee members, and thus shape the candidate list to parliament (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999). It is no surprise that those who survive in this system were those who could either recruit new members or those who responded to the demand for patronage. The fittest were those who could do both. It is also not surprising that after the change of the candidate selection method many leading politicians left the Likud party; most of whom were known for their untainted behavior.31

31 Like Benny Begin and Dan Meridor.
In order to complete the picture I should note that the first decision taken by Netanyahu’s new government after the 1996 election was to dismiss the State Service Commissioner, Itzhak Galnoor, and replace him with a weak official, Shmuel Hollander, who holds the office to this day. The reason for the dismissal was explained by Avigdor Lieberman, general director of Prime Minister’s Office: “We want people we can trust”. The decision was not quite legal, but the High Court was reluctant to intervene. The result was that political appointments were once again an option, and the new government, with its inexperienced Prime Minister, made use of them (Arian, Nachmias and Amir 2002, 142).

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Netanyahu’s government was plagued with instability from the start, and in December 1998, the Knesset voted in favor of early elections. The 1999 elections resulted in Barak’s defeat of Netanyahu. Because of his failure, Netanyahu resigned, and Ariel Sharon was elected in Likud primaries as chairman and candidate for Prime Minster. Barak’s government was also a colossal failure, and on March 2001, in the last elections held under the direct election system, Ariel Sharon ousted him with the largest margin of votes ever. Because of the Intifada and for political reasons, Sharon put together a broad government.

During 2002 the contest between Netanyahu and Sharon was fierce, and it was inflated by the expectations that after the next national election on 28 January 2003, the Likud would be the largest party in the Knesset. The polls showed that the Likud was outpacing Labor by a sizable number of seats. Once again, there was no effective opposition to protest patronage, at a time when the value of each Central Committee member, and of the registrants who elected them, was higher than ever. Such expectations and the institutional setting led businessmen, vote contractors and even
crime families to take an active part in the contest. The competition for seats on the Central Committee and on the party list led to vote-selling and other kinds of political corruption (Hofnung 2005).

This is the period when Hanegbi made many of his political appointments. Just before the elections to the party’s candidate list for parliament, the party’s unofficial newspaper published the claim that Hanegbi was involved in appointing 80 Likud members and their relatives to positions in the Ministry of the Environment. The newspaper presented it as Hanegbi’s accomplishment, in order to enhance his chances to be reelected by the Central Committee to the list for the Knesset. It helped: he took first place. But the publication had a price: one of the daily newspapers published the story, and the State Comptroller began to audit the Ministry. As noted above, the findings were unprecedented.

**Summary and discussion**

Patronage in Israel is not a new phenomenon but its range and character have changed over the years. There were years when there were many political appointments, and years when there were fewer. The level of the appointees has decreased: senior posts are no longer filled through political appointment, only the rank and file in the civil service. It seems that in the last five years patronage has reached a certain peak and that now it will decrease. Patronage life cycles seem related to developments in the political system and the global sphere, like globalization and liberalization, but as we have seen, institutional matters cannot be reduced only to those phenomena, at least not in the short run.

In intra-party contests like those that occurred in the Likud in the last five years, the only option open to a politician who does not want to grant patronage and yet be
selected as a candidate by the ruling party, is for safeguards – legal and political – to do their job. But the State Service Commissioner, Shmuel Hollander, appointed by the Likud, went along with political appointments. The Labor party lacked the will to fulfill its role as the opposition since it was maneuvered by Prime Minister Sharon, who showed a tendency to include the party in his government. Indeed, in 2004, Labor joined Sharon’s coalition, and what was left of the parliamentary opposition was an inefficient group of parties that could not cooperate because of their ideological distance.

Under these circumstances, the State Comptroller decided to take the initiative, and published one of the gravest reports ever, with unequivocal messages not only to the press and the public, but also to the Attorney General. The latter, as mentioned above, decided for the first time in Israel’s history, to order the police to open an investigation into suspicions of breach of trust against Hanegbi. This was the second historical step that State Comptroller took regarding political appointments.

There are several possible reasons for the decision of the State Comptroller and the Attorney General to make war on political appointments. One of these was probably an effect of globalization: as patronage increases and becomes more and more costly, liberal actors mobilize against it and eventually lead to a phase of politics without patronage (compare to Kitschelt 2000, 863). This is a historical irony, since the same process that encouraged parties and politicians to adopt new uses for patronage set the conditions for its end. In other words, the dynamics of patronage and its life cycles should be viewed as part of the story of globalization and its influences on party politics and its future.

32 For further details, see State Comptroller (2003). The annual report describes the Commissioner as a person who is afraid to take steps to promote investigations against senior civil service employees.
Bibliography


Furthermore, Americanization finds expression in the American way of life which is familiar to us. This consists of a certain casualness of fashion, for example the baggy trousers that are part of the hip-hop culture or the clothes of the hippy era and, of course, the comfortable sneakers. On the other hand there is a strong demand for rationality and functionality which is rather alien for Europeans. It gives the US almost unrestricted freedom of action and the status of a super power. As a further kind of Americanization it can be seen the way in which the US has recently made other countries dependent on them. With the attributes mentioned above the US appears as the world police. It can make decisions in conflict areas as short time ago in Kosovo or the Iraq. Jim Panacio Avner Molcho Israeli History 23 November 2012 The Americanization of Israel The effects of Americanization and globalization are felt in almost every country in modern society, and the state of Israel is no exception. Israel has seen the arrival of Coca-Cola and McDonalds in its cities and towns, but Americanization has done much more than that. Maoz Azaryahu has observed how Americanization has fundamentally changed some aspects of Israeli culture and society. Fast food restaurants and credit cards, for one, have become tools and items of consumption that allowed Israeli’s to part