THE IDENTIFICATION OF ‘RADICALS’ IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 1906–1914:
SOME ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

This article aims to explore the attitudes of a section of the Liberal Party, that of the Radicals, towards some aspects of British foreign policy, especially in central and eastern Europe, during the years of the Liberal Governments preceding the First World War. It illustrates the ineffectiveness of those well-meaning individuals to the creation of foreign policy. It highlights the supremacy of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, over such matters.

Edwardian Radicals looked back to the ‘Grand Old Man’ of the Liberal Party for inspiration. Indeed it was one of the problems besetting the Liberal Party during the early years of the 20th century that many members of the Party could not distance themselves from his image sufficiently enough to carry the Party forward quickly enough to combat the rise of the Labour Party.

Gladstone’s legacy in the approach to matters of foreign policy was distinctive. He had championed the idea of self-determination for the peoples of the declining Ottoman Empire and had elevated the moral tone of foreign policy by his pamphlet of 1876 concerning the Bulgarian atrocities. Indeed a concern for the fate of subject races and the abhorrence of massacres was to be of continuing concern to the Radicals. For example, Labouchere disagreed with Gladstone’s policy over Armenia and expressed the view that Austria and Russia should be allowed to ‘fight it out’ with Turkey. In 1903 it was concern for the peoples of Macedonia, who were being massacred following an unsuccessful rising against their Ottoman overlords, that prompted some Radicals to promote the Balkan Committee to make the plight of those subjects known.

Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule had split the Party in 1886. At such a time the Radicals could have expected to have made their greatest impact on matters of foreign policy but Gladstone himself defined their role in parliament as a very limited one. A particular occasion occurred during a debate initiated by Henry Richard in March 1886 that expressed backbenchers displeasure

... at their inability to reverse or even affect Government policy because party organization and the claims of party loyalty had so strengthened the Cabinet’s hand.

That was to be a charge levelled by the Radicals many times against Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary during 1905–14. Gladstone called them ‘impracticable’ men and told them that ‘Theirs
was an unwanted interference in matters which were not their concern.⁴

Happily for the Radicals, Gladstone’s anti-imperialist leanings transcended the period, despite the annexations of Egypt and Uganda. The Liberal Party had become identified so closely with him that Rosebery was able to say to Hamilton in March 1898:

Poor Liberal Party! . . . 'what a plight it is in' . . . 'For the last thirty years it has leaned absolutely on Mr. G. It has been like a man who has become accustomed to get about with a crutch only, and when that crutch is withdrawn, helplessness and hopelessness ensued.'⁵

Gladstone, whose 4th and last ministry had only ended as recently as 1894, died in May 1898, leaving the Radicals demoralized both by his actions and by his death.⁶

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By the turn of the century there were two main strands of political persuasion within the Liberal Party leadership. One consisted of the younger, more down-to-earth element, sometimes referred to as Liberal Imperialists, in such personalities as Asquith, Grey, Haldane and Rosebery who questioned why they should be hampered ‘by memories of Gladstone’s doubts, or the Quaker intransigence of Bright or the uncompromising isolationism of Cobden.’⁷ Their attitude was summed up in the slogan: ‘Away with the old party gods.’⁸ The other element of the leadership, such as Campbell-Bannerman, comprised those who still held with Gladstone’s moral dicta. It was this Radical anti-imperialist section that moved to the newer position which believed in ‘peace, retrenchment and reform.’⁹ These two groups were to struggle for the top posts in the Liberal Party in the creation of the Liberal Governments of 1905-15.

The December 1905 cabinet skilfully balanced those contending factions. The cabinet of 20 members represented all sections of the Liberal Party. The Liberal Imperialists gained four key posts. Carrington, Crewe, Elgin and Tweedmouth held the centre, while Bryce, Herbert Gladstone, Morley and Ripon maintained the Gladstonian attitude. The Radicals were championed by Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman himself, Lord Chancellor Loreburn, Augustine Birrell, John Burns, Sydney Buxton, Lloyd George and John Sinclair.¹⁰

The Boer War had marked a significant point in Radical fortunes. A. J. P. Taylor maintained that

...the war created the new Radicalism which was to triumph in 1906 and which survived, somewhat attenuated, until the setting up of Lloyd George’s coalition in 1916.¹¹

The initial military set-backs and the subsequent conduct of the conflict raised a host of questions
ranging from the efficiency or lack of it of the army; to the wisdom of such an imperialistic adventure; and to the methods employed by the British forces to win it. The war opened the divisions that had long lay dormant within the Liberal Party. Some Radicals were quite unfairly branded as being pro-Boers, but others accepted the term as a way of identification akin to 'the early Christians.' (12) That attitude of divisions within the cabinet took many years to fade away, as John Morley for example, was still inclined to think in those terms as late as 1914 over the existence or otherwise of the military conversations of 1905. (13)

Though the Radicals believed the war to be wrong they were not unpatriotic. Unlike the majority of the Irish Nationalists, they did not wish to see Britain defeated. Radicals were of a pacifistic tendency and believed that war could have been avoided by negotiation. (14) In keeping with Gladstonian traditional thinking they did not wish to see the war as a means to yet further imperial territorial conquests. They became horrified by the news of the fate of people in the concentration camps and indeed it was Campbell-Bannerman’s famous ‘methods of barbarism’ speech accusing the Government of employing it in South Africa that altered the direction of debate away from the causes of the war to the way in which it was being fought. (15)

Additionally, the Boer War discredited the competence as well as the principles of those who had organized it due to the military set-backs and the deficiencies in the quality of the fighting forces employed. A parallel could be drawn with the conduct of the Crimean War. (16) Consequently the Imperialists who had held the moral initiative in the closing years of the nineteenth century lost out to those who re-created the ties between the Radicals and the Labour Party at a time when they had seemed to be going their own separate ways. (17) The reverberations of the South African War were keenly felt in Radical circles for many years afterwards. Even as late as 1915 Lloyd George was able to state sharply to Frances Stevenson:

We didn’t win... The Boers - the Dutch - are the rulers in South Africa. We had to give them back their land to rule - for us!... Had we not done this... we should now [1915] have been driven from South Africa... Botha and the others would have gone back to their farms, and waited for the moment - this moment - when all our energies are wanted elsewhere, to drive us from South Africa. We didn’t win the Boer War! (18)

During the Great War the Radicals abhorrence of war was exemplified by the comparison to the Boer conflict in that they believed that a negotiated peace was much more desirable than fighting on for total, all-out victory.

It could be claimed that most Radicals stuck to their principles in an unflinching way and with the total conviction of men who belief themselves to be right. Nevertheless it would be an error to believe that they translated that into consistency in matters of policy. Theirs was a minority voice. They did not admit to that and indeed because they cared so much for their issues of dissent made the mistake of claiming to speak for a much more influential section of society.
Their optimism sprang from their belief in the ‘good sense of men.’ They held that they knew what was morally right and what was wrong and that what was the latter could never be politically right. Unfortunately for them, such moral high-mindedness was fine for those who held similar views but left unmoved those who did not have the same faith. Consequently it was insufficient to solve political problems and left the more pragmatic politicians with an open field in which to plough their policies. Their idealism left them vulnerable to such sentiments could rarely be upheld in Party programmes. As A. J. A. Morris starkly puts it:

It could be argued that the demise of English Radicalism was inevitable because the psychological and material conditions that had fostered and enhanced it no longer existed after 1914. In a society increasingly susceptible to a mistaken conception of determinist philosophies, there could no longer be a place for men whose political judgement was answerable to outdated moral and religious imperatives.

They were sure that the Liberal Governments of 1905 onwards were conducting foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey in a way that left those Governments open to the charge that those Governments denied that moral power was the fundamental predominant force in the world. Even one of their number, namely Campbell-Bannerman, ‘the first Radical Prime Minister’ somewhat cynically expressed the realities of politics by his comment ‘... that criticism in opposition was one thing; accomplished fact another; ...’

Before examining Sir Edward Grey’s disposition towards foreign policy matters prior to 1906, a brief resume of the Radicals’ reactions to the Conservative approach under Balfour is necessary.

Following the Boer War which had so upset the susceptibilities of the Radicals a re-appraisal of British foreign policy was undertaken as a matter of urgency. It was felt, quite rightly, by the Conservative Government of the day that if the struggle against the Boers had been so protracted and painful an experience for the British army then Britain could hardly hope to compete militarily against the massive conscript armies of the continental Great Powers. Furthermore the British Empire had been seen by other Powers to be in initial difficulties in dealing with the Dutch farmers and that had provoked the Kaiser into sending his tactless telegram to President Kruger. It must have seemed as if all the eyes of Europe were on Britain. However the end of ‘splendid isolation’ with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 had not prepared the Radicals for the surprise of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904.

To the Radicals it seemed incredible that the Conservatives under Balfour appeared to be adopting Radical policies in foreign affairs. They believed that the Entente of 1904 was the climax of their campaign to have Radical policies adopted in matters of foreign policy. It must be stated that normally the Radicals detested all foreign commitments and alliances but they accepted that if any were to be undertaken in the interests of the nation then at least the revival of the ‘old liberal alliance’ was the best that could be hoped for. They certainly preferred it to any thought of joining
the Triple Alliance, due to the fact that Germany and Austria-Hungary had autocratic, repressive governments, not as bad as Tsarist Russia, but still bad enough.

Furthermore the Radicals were delighted by Sir Edward Grey’s expressed intention that the Entente would be maintained during the period of office of a Liberal Government. In October 1905, two months before being appointed Foreign Secretary, he emphasized

\[ \ldots \text{the need for continuity in foreign policy. There is an impression in some quarters that free Government owing to the changes of party cannot have the same trustworthy and reliable foreign policy as autocratic governments. I believe that to be wrong - as regards ourselves, certainly wrong.} \]

The desire for ‘continuity’ expressed in those words was not an exceptional political incident. Indeed Lord Rosebery had said the same thing about the need for a continuous foreign policy in his speeches at St. George’s-in-the-East on 23 June 1892 and at the Albert Hall on 5 July 1895. However, one can draw the interesting conclusion from Grey’s words that as they were given before becoming Foreign Secretary they were also arrived at before he was influenced by the permanent advisers at the Foreign Office.

The Radicals were ecstatic also over the responses that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was making concerning foreign affairs. He gave a speech on 21 December 1905 at the Albert Hall which though chiefly concerned with home affairs nevertheless contained sufficient comments on foreign policy to be nicknamed by the Radicals as ‘the League of Peace Speech.’ The Radical W. T. Stead (not an MP) claimed that Campbell-Bannerman had the confidence and respect of the Radicals and was held in ‘...a certain amount of awe by the Liberal Leaguers... An honest man, a sound Liberal... and a deadly hater of all the crimes of the Jingo.’

Unfortunately for the Radicals Campbell-Bannerman was nearing the end of his premiership and his life so that by the time that he died in 1908 they had become distinctly disillusioned with the Foreign Secretary’s policy. For most of the period of 1906-14 the Radicals were dissatisfied with Sir Edward Grey’s approach to foreign policy, and yet they seemed unable to do anything to effectively modify it. So whom were they confronting?

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Sir Edward Grey was a very conservative figure with a stiff, inflexible personality. Additionally he held an anti-German attitude long before he took office which he maintained in varying degrees throughout the period of his appointment. Undoubtedly those two factors accounted for the most part as to why the Radicals seemed helpless to influence the foreign policy of the day.

His contemporaries found him to be a daunting character, aloof, all too prepared to keep his own counsel. In 1900 Arthur Acland wrote in a letter to Asquith that 'I think he [Grey] is a man
rather to see difficulties than to help people over them ... At the time of Campbell-Bannerman becoming Prime Minister in December 1905 he proved to be the most implacable of the Relugas Triumvirate despite the fact that later in his memoirs he claimed to be the least interested in holding office. He was ‘the “strong, silent man” whom the generation brought up on Carlyle earnestly sought ... As Massingham wrote in the Speaker on 12 May 1906:

Sir Edward Grey is one of the four or five men who have at once attained a position of great authority in the New House of Commons [based on a] ... force of magnetism which is exercised without any effort, with no recourse to familiar arts of speech, but is rather a pure effect of personality.

Even as late as 1913 A. G. Gardiner reinforced that image of the Foreign Secretary by writing:

Sir Edward Grey is intrinsically the weightiest speaker of his time. When he sits down in the House of Commons it is as though discussion has ceased ... He does not argue; he delivers a judgement. There is no appeal, and no one asks for an appeal.

Such is the profile of a man who once he has made up his mind, sticks to it, even if not necessarily for the right reasons. The Radicals could not get far with altering the policy of someone like that. He would twist and turn at each set of objections or difficulty, threatening dire consequences for the nation’s security here, and threatening to resign there, but in reality acting as cunning as a fox.

If one examines his anti-German stance, and adds that, to the description above of his personality one can begin to appreciate how war with Germany seemed to be just a matter of time. In fact it would not be too strong a comment to use Concord’s phrase in its April 1914 edition, in referring to the passing of Winston Churchill’s massive increase in naval estimates, and applying that to Grey: it could ‘understand well the difficulties of our friends in the House of Commons.’

It would be fair to state that any pro-Russian move by Britain could be construed on the continent to be an anti-German move and especially so after the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. Or at least that is how the Germans could be expected to see it, a policy of encirclement - Einkreisungspolitik.

According to H. C. G. Matthew in The Liberal Imperialists, Grey as Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the 1892-5 Liberal Government had advocated that Britain should reach an understanding with Russia over mutual problems in Asia. Shortly after leaving the Foreign Office Grey had come to the conclusion that ‘the accommodation of Russia should become the chief priority of British policy.’ In a letter to Buxton, Grey stated the views that he was to hold until his return to the Foreign Office in 1905 amongst which was the comment:

Unless Russia is bent on annexing Persia, room could easily be found for her wants and
ours both in Asia and Europe: & if Russia stands aside we ought to be able to deal easily with any combination of European navies, which is possible at present.\[31\]

It can therefore be seen that, given his approval of the Fashoda matter with France, his desire to come to an understanding pre-dated any thought of an entente with France by several years. Matthew maintains that 'Grey never showed any enthusiasm for Germany in this period,'\[32\] that is before the Boer War, and even goes so far as to distinguish a totally different approach from Russia and Germany in the Far East, far more favourable to the former than the latter, to the extent of being prepared to sacrifice British local interests in China to Russia.

Grey disliked Chamberlain’s desire for an Anglo-German alliance\[33\] and regarded Chamberlain’s speech at Leicester on 30 November 1899 as ‘disastrous.’\[34\] And again Grey criticized Chamberlain’s final attempts at achieving an Anglo-German alliance in 1901.\[35\] When Chamberlain in October of the same year spoke out publicly against Germany in frustration, Grey praised him for it.\[36\]

By the end of the Boer War Grey desired some understanding with France. In fact by 1902 Grey seemed to have created an either/or situation, which would be in keeping with his personality outlined above:

We had hitherto cultivated our good relations with Germany at the expense of our good relations with Russia and with France, and we were now cultivating them at the expense of . . . our good relations with the United States.\[37\]

The Radicals, seeking an idealistic international harmony, wanted to be on good terms with all nations and therefore would attempt to avoid such an either/or approach. Grey welcomed the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and in a speech in the House of Commons, just two months after its creation, which established himself as the opposition spokesman on foreign policy, he alluded to its existence as ‘a working model for other cases’ hinting at a similar arrangement with Russia.\[38\] In 1905 he was even prepared to subordinate the idea of foreign policy continuity in the event of a change of political party in power by claiming ‘that if any government drags us back into the German net I will oppose it openly at all costs.’\[39\]

Most significantly, Matthew disclaims any Foreign Office pressure on Grey in his anti-German stance and in fact denies any close contact with the Foreign Office staff whilst Grey was in opposition. Once in office it is my contention that the leading officials of the Foreign Office such as Eyre Crowe and Arthur Nicolson simply egged him on in his policy direction by supplying him with those papers and supporting evidence that he wished to see or indeed that he chose to select those parts of which were in keeping with his thinking. As Acland wrote to Spender, Sir Edward Grey was a man ‘of very fixed opinions.’\[40\]

If one catalogues the comments of Grey in 1906 when he had just become Foreign Secretary and before the Foreign Office had had an opportunity to influence him deeply in any particular
direction one can understand clearly what was to follow during his period in office. His thinking in foreign policy matters did not fundamentally alter before 1914.

As early as 3 January following his appointment, he clearly warned the German ambassador in what he claimed to be a repetition of what Lansdowne had said the previous summer that '. . . feeling in England and sympathy with France, if she got into trouble over the document which originated our friendship with her, would be so strong that it would be impossible for any government to remain neutral.'\(^{(41)}\) In the following month he wrote a memorandum containing his views:

> If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it. The entente and still more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection (official, naval, political, commercial, municipal and in the Press) have created in France a belief that we should support her in war . . . If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive us.

> There would also, I think, be a general feeling in every country that we had behaved meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a friendly arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to reinsure herself elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and Germany would take some pleasure, after what has passed, in exploiting the whole situation to our disadvantage, very likely by stirring up trouble through the Sultan of Turkey in Egypt.\(^{(42)}\)

And yet again, in June, this time to Cambon

> . . . if anything arose which made it necessary to choose between France and Germany, public opinion here would be as decided on the French side as ever.\(^{(43)}\)

Grey told Cambon that he opposed the proposed meeting of Edward VII with the Kaiser on the continent and that of the latter to Britain. And finally, in July ‘if we were called on to take sides, we must take sides with France as at Algeciras.’\(^{(44)}\)

Grey really wanted the entente to be in effect an alliance as the military conversations indicated. However, like any good diplomat walking the tightrope of definite commitments vis-à-vis having freedom of manoeuvre he wished publicly to appear to be free of military ties with any other country. The fact that those ‘conversations’ were kept secret supports this idea. Furthermore Grey’s disposition can be documented in this matter in the same year:

> The difficulty of making an alliance with France now is that Germany might attack France at once, while Russia is helpless, fearing lest when Russia recovered she (Germany) should be crushed by a new Triple Alliance against her. She might make an alliance between us and France a pretext for doing this as her only chance of securing her
After all, what does it matter publicly whether you call such an Anglo-French understanding an ‘entente’ or an ‘alliance’ if secretly the intentions are that it be a military commitment?

Grey’s predisposition to accept alliances could be identified from his reaction to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In 1902 he made no public comment or attack on it nor spoke in the February adjournment debate when Harcourt and Campbell-Bannerman were opposed to it on the basis of avoiding alliances. This was despite his realization that it was aimed at Russia with whom he desired the settlement of Asiatic disagreements (as mentioned above). Grey accepted the alliance’s renewal in its extended form in 1905. The Radicals later accused Grey of having committed Britain to France by authorizing those military conversations.

It was not that the Radicals were pro-German, though some undoubtedly were for they saw her as being the core of Europe’s cultural heritage. Such high-minded and spiritually-guided people, who for the most part were well-educated, saw a paradox in the land of Goethe and Beethoven becoming involved in a confrontational naval arms race. Very few of them knew anything of Germany at first hand for very few of them had either travelled or studied there. Noel Buxton, for example, who was the Foreign Secretary’s most influential critic within the Liberal Party had never visited the German capital until the Agadir crisis of 1911. He, like other Radicals, felt that Germany was being ‘penned in’ and anyway preferred dealings with her than with the paragon of oppressive, autocratic government, Tsarist Russia. As Keir Hardie stated at the Labour Party conference in 1912:

If he was called upon to choose between the autocracy of Russia and the present German government he would most unhesitatingly cast his lot on the side of Germany against Russia.

According to A. J. A. Morris most of the Radicals blamed Britain and her aggressive foreign policy for promoting the desire for large arsenals. Wedgwood put the Radicals’ pessimism at its most extreme when he said in the House of Commons in 1911:

You cannot point to one spot from China to Peru where the influence of the Liberal government has made anything better or influenced things in the slightest degree in a Liberal direction.

As most Radicals were Liberals most of them wanted to think well of Sir Edward Grey and his conduct of foreign policy during 1906–14 but for most of them it was a case of having to accept it as there was no real parliamentary alternative.

Sir Edward Grey did not want MPs to have influence on his foreign policy. His attitude stated
in October 1906 to Nicolson is very reminiscent of Gladstone’s comment twenty years earlier (mentioned above):

I am not looking forward to it. The new members have now acquired the art of asking questions and raising debates and there is so much in foreign affairs which attracts attention and had much better be left alone.\(^{53}\)

As observed by H. Temperley and L. A. Penson, Grey took the public far less into his confidence than Palmerston if measured by the quality and quantity of Blue-books produced.\(^{54}\) The Radicals were to be repeatedly fobbed of with evasive or ambiguous answers in the House of Commons, and on too many occasions for their liking, by the well understood meaning of the Foreign Secretary putting his finger to his lips. Grey’s comment to Barclay in 1908 shows the quite condescending attitude that he held towards those elected by the people:

As regards to the Armenian Blue Book, we have to publish these things at certain times; there are several members of Parliament who take a very keen interest in Armenian affairs, prompted, no doubt, by some of the Armenian societies in London. We do not mind how much you bowdlerize the Blue Book as long as we are able to publish something; with us it is really the quantity and not the quality that are wanted for the House of Commons.\(^{55}\)

Of course an element of secrecy in foreign affairs is inevitable and other European governments were also doing the same, if not worse, but the nature of the post suited Grey’s personality well and he would have erred on the side of excessive caution by nature. One must also remember that he was the foreign affairs spokesman in a society that claimed to be increasingly democratic so the statements of his above do not fit well with that image. In fact Temperley and Penson maintain that as parliament became more democratic its control over foreign matters lessened.\(^{56}\)

Both Grey’s anti-German policy and the dislike of parliamentary comment were mirrored in the Foreign Office summed up by Sir Arthur Nicolson writing to Sir Edward Grey in 1912:

Were it possible to conclude a naval arrang[emen]t both with Russia and France I am sure that our position would be more secure - and it is probable that Germany, in view of such a strong naval combination, would be disposed to slacken her rate of construction . . . I fear, however, that we are precluded from entering into any such understanding owing to our unfortunate parliamentary exigencies.\(^{57}\)

The dual combination of such secrecy and the animosity towards Europe’s leading military State was eventually most likely to lead to war. There simply was not time for Radical opposition
to mount a counter objection to such a foreign policy when they simply did not have the information as to how international events were developing. For example in 1911 it seemed that by the time the Radicals knew of the dangers of how close to war Britain and Germany had been the crisis had passed. Radical protests against the foreign policy producing the friction came too late, led by Noel Buxton, and occurring in November, after the international tension had peaked. Likewise one could maintain that the speed with which the crisis of August 1914 arose and was made public gave the Radicals no real opportunity to mobilize.

The Radicals attempted to explain Edward Grey’s approach by two lines of attack on him. One was that he was the prisoner of his staff and was just acting as a spokesman for the more permanent, faceless Foreign Office officials. The other line of Radical attempt to excuse his approach was to suggest that all ‘foreign policy was a conspiracy, conducted behind the backs of “the people.”’ The Radicals believed that the professional diplomats and the ‘governing class’ were united in keeping foreign policy matters free from outside and democratic influences. It was as if the diplomats were playing a ‘great game of chess’ called the Balance of Power. Consequently it amounted to the fact that friction with Germany was the result of the private opinions of a small number of diplomats and others at the Foreign Office.

Of course there were times when Sir Edward Grey’s foreign policy seemed to coincide with the wishes of the Radicals but that was more by luck than judgement. It suited Grey for purely reasons of high politics to appear to co-operate with Germany, as for example, over the Balkan crisis of 1912 when he wished to restrict the spread of Austro-German influence in the peninsula, and therefore attempted to restrain all the Powers from interfering there by resorting to a policy of activating the Concert of Europe. A. J. P. Taylor describes the Agadir crisis of 1911 as the crisis that ‘blew up out of a clear sky,’ as if to imply that Anglo-German relations beforehand were good. In view of the preceding years of the naval arms race and in particular of the 1909 Dreadnought construction scare one cannot share Taylor’s optimism. The very existence of the naval arms race strained Anglo-German relations right up to the First World War. One could argue that Grey could see war with Germany as the ultimate way to put an end to the international uncertainty, remembering that Germany was known to be growing even stronger vis-à-vis her neighbours in a whole range of socio-economic sectors. Noel Buxton’s comment of July 1912 is somewhat nearer the reality: ‘The spirit which promoted the Boer war’ he wrote, ‘is the spirit which is concerned in the present question of Anglo-German relations.’ One is more inclined to believe the feelings of the Radicals expressed later that they had come ‘to believe that Grey had cheated them: he had talked peace while preparing for war.’

Inside parliament most Radicals were too pre-occupied with the domestic issues of the day to have the time or inclination to study foreign matters deeply. Even for most politicians anything
east of Vienna must have seemed very remote, akin to affairs in Africa. As A. J. P. Taylor claimed:

A man with an intelligent interest in foreign affairs...would read Brailsford on Macedonia; E. G. Browne on Persia; E. D. Morel on Morocco; Seton-Watson on Hungary; Miss M. E. Durham on Albania.

rather than wade through Hansard or the heavily edited Foreign Office blue books. Indeed the maritime supremacy of Britain and the recent period of ‘Splendid Isolation’ adhered to by Salisbury had strengthened the deliberate detachment from European affairs and helped to emphasize the natural sense of insularity that the British people possessed.

One must not underestimate the strength of these sentiments, however difficult they may be to measure and quantify, any less than more basic personal drives in human considerations. Liberal Radicals were naturally very conscious of damaging their career prospects if they spoke out in criticism of the Government’s accepted policies. For example John Robertson, MP for the Tyneside division of Northumberland 1906–18, spoke in parliament annually from 1906 until 1910 in favour of arms reduction but thereafter said nothing on the topic before the First World War. Perhaps his appointment and promotion to Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade 1911–15 made him think twice about being noted to be too much of a Radical. Of course it could also work the other way too, that if someone was freed from a position of high office or direct working contact with senior government members then the Radical felt able to express himself openly. John Ellis, MP for the Rushcliffe division of Nottinghamshire since 1885 is an example. He was the Under-Secretary of State to the India Office 1905–6 during which time he said nothing controversial in parliament about arms reduction and expenditure. Thereafter he annually raised the issue until his death on 5 December 1910. And Thomas Lough, MP for W. Islington 1892–1918, who had been the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education from December 1905 until 1908 felt free to raise the matter of arms reduction and expenditure in 1910, 1911, 1913 and 1914. Presumably one could argue, in all fairness to the last two named individuals that as the naval arms race with Germany accelerated and the tension between the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance grew that they would have eventually had something to say about the arms topic, but one is still left wondering whether or not that would have really been the case.

The reticence or apparent inability of the 29 senior positioned Radicals openly to criticize the Government in parliament appears elsewhere too. None of them questioned the secrecy surrounding the conduct of foreign affairs as carried out by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office simply did not give parliament as much information, purportedly for \textit{raisons d’état}, as the Radicals would have liked. Likewise none of those senior Radicals raised the issue of the House of Commons having prior notice of treaties entered into with foreign states. They did not criticize either the visit of King Edward VII to Russia in June 1908 or the visit of the Tsar to England in August 1909.

It was the backbenchers who clamoured over such matters. Foreign Office secrecy was a
matter of concern to them in 1909, the year of the German Dreadnought building scare, but it became a major issue in 1911 in response to the Agadir crisis when more than a dozen MPs openly raised the idea that a Foreign Office conspiracy of silence in the handling of foreign policy had led Britain to the very verge of war with Germany before parliament had realized what was happening. John Dillon, the leader of the Irish Nationalists spoke on this in the crucial years of 1909, 1911 and 1912 while his compatriot and colleague John MacNeill spoke in 1909 and annually from 1911 to the outbreak of the First World War. Noel Buxton and Arthur Ponsonby were the most vocal Liberal protagonists. In 1911 it was the Labour members Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald who spearheaded the claim that the House of Commons ought to be the dominant voice in treaty creation with foreign powers.

One can examine the 138 Radicals listed in APPENDIX 1 for the period 1906-13 to see how many spoke on foreign affairs matters specific to foreign countries and the conflicts those countries were involved in, rather than on international issues such as arms reduction and arbitration. The picture oscillates between about 21 (15%) in 1907 and about 37 (27%) in 1911 and 1912.

Of those who actually spoke on foreign affairs during 1906-13, often it was a single occasion on a single issue but 36% of those who spoke in 1906 chose to speak on more than one occasion, 48% in 1907, 64% in 1908 and 1909, 41% in 1910, 89% in 1911, 70% in 1912 and 41% in 1913. These figures neatly echo the Radicals alarm at the rising international tension between the two armed camps in Europe, their response to the Agadir crisis of 1911 and the concern about the wars between Turkey and her neighbours in 1911 and 1912.

It is sufficient to note here that the Radicals in parliament spoke repeatedly in criticism of the Tsarist regime as it represented the extreme opposite of what Liberalism and Democracy stood for. In the Balkans the plight of the Macedonians touched the conscience of Radical MPs while the corresponding inability of the crumbling Turkish Empire to reform its administration of the subject races caused exasperation. In contrast to Russia and the Balkans amazingly little was known and said in parliament about Austria-Hungary. Considering its somewhat closer proximity to Britain and that it constituted the largest state in Europe (excluding Russia) and had the third largest population in Europe (after those of Russia and Germany) one would have expected to have heard more from MPs about the Dual Monarchy.

**CONCLUSION**

The Radicals were no match for the Liberal Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office who based their arguments on the policy of continuity inherited from the Conservative Government that ended in December 1905. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, based his policy on upholding international law to which he subordinated all considerations of humanitarian concern. He would act only in concert with the Great Powers so that neither Britain nor those Powers would be out of step with each other thereby hopefully ensuring international harmony and peace.
The Radicals had no leader. They spoke and wrote as individuals. Therefore they were unable to bring weight to bear in Parliament sufficient to alter British foreign policy. The causes for which they gave responses were minority interests so it was extremely difficult to arouse widespread public concern. Most British people and politicians simply were not interested in far-away lands that formed no part of the British Empire. They were pre-occupied with domestic matters such as the welfare programme put forward by the Liberal Governments of 1905-1915.

The Gladstonian ideas relating to the self-determination of small nationalities were the ideal situation. But the Radicals' attitudes towards imperialism in eastern Europe were not necessarily condemnatory. So long as the rule of the State was deemed for the benefit of the people it could be tolerated.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was looked on with the greatest satisfaction of the three great empires. The western German-dominated part was considered to have inherited the glories of nineteenth-century German culture. The eastern domains, however, were considered to be relatively backward as they were ruled by Hungarians who denied the minorities under their sway any share in power.

Compared with Austria-Hungary, Russia was disliked by the Radicals because it was seen as a land of barbaric, uncivilized Slavs. It was seen to be the bastion of autocracy despite the upheavals of 1905. Autocracy meant the total denial of the individual’s freedom which jarred on Radical sentiments. The Tsarist regime was seen to be oppressive and intolerant. Russia nevertheless found some favour in Radical minds compared with Turkey for, in the absence of pogroms, it at least gave law and order to the people.

The Ottoman Empire was ‘the sick man of Europe’ and the Radicals thought that the sooner he died the better. They saw that the Balkan States that had gained independence from Turkish rule had developed in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile the Turkish lands had remained virtually unchanged for five centuries. In Macedonia a total lack of government resulted in corruption and anarchy.

In all the three empires the Radicals hoped for the greater participation of the subject peoples in government. That in turn would facilitate the harmony necessary for economic progress and be conducive to international peace.

Not all Radicals were the same in the strength of their convictions. The majority were not prepared to risk their careers by upsetting their seniors and the Establishment. For them, 4 August 1914 left them helping the British Government to the best of their abilities. What had decided the issue had been Germany’s invasion of Belgium, that is, the image of a large State or Empire oppressing a small country or nationality. Their consciences were apparently cleared by such an act of aggression. It then fell to the Radicals to do all they could to defeat Germany as the manifestation of militarism. As a result of that attitude it followed that Germany’s chief ally, Austria-Hungary, should be dismembered. It is interesting, however, that so many subsequently shunned any agreement with the Bolsheviks when Tsarist Russia collapsed. That was because
they were Radicals and not revolutionaries.

For others, that is a minority of Radicals, convictions were held to be sacrosanct. Consequently they failed to achieve the heights of success in their careers even if they were successful in their causes. Such were the cases, for example, of E. D. Morel and C. P. Trevelyan. One reason was that they were highly individualistic people. They lacked unity and the cohesion of a policy. They argued amongst themselves. Some chose the independence and solitude of travelling to remote places. That helps to explain why Bourchier found such a fascination in Bulgaria, Noel Buxton in Macedonia, Miss Durham in Albania, Lynch in Armenia and Persia, Morel in the Congo and Nevinson in the Angolan slave trade. After all, there was plenty of suffering nearer home with poverty in Britain and the British oppression of Ireland.

These Radicals, of such strong conviction, were very anti-militaristic and opposed to war not just because of the suffering that those facets entailed but also because they represented subordination of the individual to the State, which was an encroachment on people's freedom. Hence one always comes in this analysis back to the extreme individualism of those Radicals. They believed that, in order to reduce the State’s power to manipulate the individual in matters of foreign policy, secret diplomacy should become open. With a view to that end, these Radicals were strong supporters of the idea of having the House of Commons possess control over the Foreign Office in finally deciding foreign policy. It was not just a case of becoming more democratic but of increasing the individual's say in national affairs.
APPENDIX 1

RADICALS INSIDE PARLIAMENT

1907–1914

This list has been compiled from *Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament*, volumes II and III, edited by Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees. The names of these Radicals have been checked in many other sources in order to verify the decision to include them. *Hansard* is an example, as well as numerous secondary works, such as *Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892-1914* by H. V. Emy.

Abraham,                           Rt. Hon. William (‘Mabon’)
Addison,                           Rt. Hon. Christopher
Adkins,                            Sir William Ryland Dent
Alden,                             Percy
Arnold,                            Sydney
Atherley-Jones,                    Llewellyn Archer
Baker,                             Joseph Allen
Barnard,                           Edmund Broughton
Barnes,                            Rt. Hon. George Nicoll
Beaumont,                          Hon. Hubert George
Bellocc,                           Joseph Hilaire Peter Rene
Benn,                              Sir John Williams
Bennett,                           Sir Ernest Nathaniel
Bentham,                           George Jackson
Billson,                           Alfred
Burt,                              Rt. Hon. Thomas
Buxton,                            Charles Roden
Buxton,                            Rt. Hon. Noel Edward
Byles,                             Sir William Pollard
Chancellor,                        Henry George
Cobbold,                           Felix Thornley
Collins,                           Rt. Hon. Sir Godfrey Pattison
Cooper,                            George J.
Cotton, Sir Henry John Stedman
Cremer, Sir William Randal
Curran, Peter Francis
Dalziel, Rt. Hon. Sir James Henry, Bart.
Davies, David (Baron 1932)
Davies, Ellis William
Davies, Timothy
Dawes, James Arthur
De Forest, Baron Maurice Arnold
Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas
Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Willoughby Hyett
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Wentworth, Bart.
Dillon, John
Dunn, Albert Edward
Edwards, John Hugh
Esslemont, George Birnie
Fenwick, Rt. Hon. Charles
Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Balthazar Walter (Baron Ilkeston 1910)
Fullerton, Hugh
Glanville, Harold James
Gooch, George Peabody
Grant, J. Corrie
Greenwood, Sir Granville George
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Sir Hamar, Bart.
Hall, Frederick
Harcourt, Robert Venables Vernon
Hardie, James Keir
Hart-Davies, Thomas
Harvey, Alexander Gordon Cummins
Harvey, Thomas Edmund
Hazel, Alfred Ernest William
Helme, Sir Norval Watson
Hemmerde, Edward George
Henderson, Rt. Hon. Arthur
Higham, John Sharp
Hogge, James Myles
Holt, Richard Durning
Hope, John Deans
Horne, Rev. Charles Silvester
John, Edward Thomas
Johnson, William
Jones, Sir Edgar Rees
Jones, Rt. Hon. Leifchild Stratten (Baron Rhayader 1932)
Jowett, Rt. Hon. Frederick William
Kellaway, Rt. Hon. Frederick George
King, Joseph
Lamb, Edmund George
Lamb, Sir Ernest Henry
Lambert, Richard Cornthwaite
Langley, J. Batty
Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George
Law, Hugh Alexander
Lawson, Sir Wilfred, Bart. (II)
Lea, Hugh Cecil
Leese, Sir Joseph Francis, Bart.
Lees-Smith, Rt. Hon. Hastings Bertrand
Lehmann, Rudolf Chambers
Luttrell, Hugh Courtenay Fownes
Lynch, Henry Finnis Blosse
Macdonald, Rt. Hon. James Ramsay
Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Archibald Murray
Mackarness, Frederick Michael Coleridge
MacNeill, John Gordon Swift
Maddison, Fred
Markham, Sir Arthur Basil, Bart.
Martin, Joseph
Mason, David Marshall
McArthur, William Alexander
McLaren, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Benjamin Bright, Bart.
Millar, Sir James Duncan
Molteno, Percy Alport
Money, Sir Leo George Chiozza
Morrell, Philip Edward
Nicholson, Sir Charles Norris, Bart.
Nuttall, Harry
Outhwaite, Robert Leonard
Pearson, Sir Weetman Dickinson, Bart.
Pickersgill, Edward Hare
Pirie, Duncan Vernon
Ponsonby, Arthur Augustus William Harry
Raffan, Peter Wilson
Rendall, Athelstan
Richards, Rt. Hon. Thomas
Richardson, Arthur
Roberts, Sir John Herbert, Bart.
Rowlands, James
Rowntree, Arnold Stephenson
Rutherford, Vickerman Henzell
Samuel, Sir Stuart Montagu, Bart.
Scott, Alexander MacCallum
Scott, Alfred Henry
Sherwell, Arthur James
Shipman, John Greenwood
Silcock, Thomas Ball
Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert, Bart.
Stewart, Halley
Stuart, James
Swann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Ernest, Bart.
Thomas, David Alfred
Thorne, Rt. Hon. William James
Toulmin, Sir George
Vivian, Henry Harvey
Wadsworth, John
Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay Theydon, Bart.
Watt, Henry Anderson
Wedgwood, Col. Rt. Hon. Josiah Clement
White, James Dundas
Whitehouse, John Howard
Williams, John
Wilson, Henry Joseph
Wilson, John (III)
Wilson.
Wing.
Yoxall.

Philip Whitwell
Thomas Edward
Sir James Henry
APPENDIX 2

RADICALS WHO GAINED SENIOR POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT

These names have been compiled in the same way as Appendix 1. This list has been formed by an examination of the work *British Political Facts 1900-1985* by David & Gareth Butler, Macmillan, London, 1986, 4–7. Below are those Radicals who were members of the Liberal Government 1905–15. They were ‘Ministers in Cabinet,’ ‘Ministers Not in Cabinet,’ and ‘Junior Ministers Attached.’

Acland, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Dyke, Bart.
Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine
Bryce, Rt. Hon. James (1st. Viscount 1914)
Burns, Rt. Hon. John
Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney Charles (1st. Earl 1920)
Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Leonard Spencer
Ellis, Rt. Hon. John Edward
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert John
Haldane, Rt. Hon. Richard Burdon (1st. Viscount 1911)
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis Venables Vernon (1st. Viscount 1917)
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David
Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas
Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Thomas James
Mallet, Charles Edward
Masterman, Rt. Hon. Charles Frederick Gurney
McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Morley, Rt. Hon. John
Norton, Capt. Cecil William
Roberts, Charles Henry
Robertson, Rt. Hon. John MacKinnon
Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter (Baron 1937)
Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Louis (Viscount 1937)
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook
Sinclair, Rt. Hon. John (1st Baron Pentland 1909)
Tennant, Rt. Hon. Harold John
Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Philips, Bart.
Whitley, Rt. Hon. John Henry
Wood, Rt. Hon. Thomas McKinnon
APPENDIX 3

BALKAN COMMITTEE

END OF 1906

* before an entry represents the first time that the name or detail has appeared.
* after an entry represents the fact that the person or detail did not appear on this list but was on that of the preceding year.

PRESIDENT

WESTLAKE Professor* K. C.

VICE-PRESIDENTS

ABERDEEN, Earl of
BARNETT, Rev. Canon
BATH AND WELLS, Right Rev. The Bishop of
BRASSEY, Lord
CADBURY, GEORGE Mr.
CAVENDISH, FREDERICK Lady
CLIFFORD, Rev. Dr.
GLADSTONE, HERBERT Right Hon.
HEREFORD, Right Rev. The Bishop of
HOLLAND, SCOTT Rev. Canon
LICHFIELD, Right Rev. The Bishop of
LIVERPOOL, Right Rev. The Bishop of
MacCOLL,* Rev. Canon
MILIUKOFF Professor
STANMORE, Lord
WORCESTER,* The Right Rev. The Bishop of
*BIRMINGHAM, [sic] The Right Rev. The Bishop of
SECRETARY

MOORE, W. A.

GENERAL COMMITTEE

BENSON, GODFREY
BICKERSTETH, HENRY*
BRUCE, ROSSLYN
CHESTERTON, G. K.
COLLIER, C. F.
CONWAY, R. S.
DEARMER, PERCY
FARRER,
FRY, T. C.
HARRIS, RENDEL
JENKS,
LAWRENCE, PETHICK, F. W.
LYTTON,
MACDONALD, J. M.
MARSHALL, JOSEPHINE
MASON, D. M.
McCURDY, EDWARD
*OTTLEY, H. BICKERSTEITH
RAWNSLEY,
RICHARDSON,
SMITH, SAMUEL*
SPICER, ALBERT
STEPNEY,
SYMONDS, ARTHUR G.
THOMAS, F. G.
TREVELYAN, C. P.
TREVELYAN, G. M.
*WHITWELL WILSON, P.
HON. TREASURER

YERBURGH, R. A., Mr.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN

BUXTON, NOEL Mr.

MEMBERS

*BOYLE, E. GURNEY

BRAILSFORD, H. N. Mr.
BROOKS, E. W. Mr.
*BRYCE, J. ANNAN

BUXTON, CHARLES RODEN Mr.
CHRISTIAN, BERTRAM Mr.
CROOK, W. M. Mr.
EVANS, ARTHUR Dr. *F. R. S.
GARDINER, A. G. Mr.
GOOCH, G. P. Mr. MP
HAMMOND, J. L. Mr.
HARRIS, CECIL Mr.
HECHT, C. E. Mr.
HOBHOUSE, L. T. Mr.
LAW, HUGH Mr. MP
MALLOCH, G. R. Mr.
MASTERMAN, C. F. G. Mr. MP
NEVINSON, H. W. Mr.
*NEWBOULD, T. PALMER

SAMUEL, HERBERT* Mr. MP
SCOTT, A. M. Mr.
SCOTT-JAMES, R. A. Mr.
STEAD, ALFRED Mr.
TORR, H. J. Mr.
VILLARI, L. Mr.
WILLIAMS, ANEURIN Mr.
YOUNG, HILTON Mr.

HON. LOCAL SECRETARIES

ARNOLD, E. V. Professor
BARLOW Miss
*BARRITT, C. W.
BOOTH, ALFRED Mr.
BUNSEN, de Mrs.
BUXTON, L. W. Mr.
FORREST, J. C. Rev.
*HICKSON Mrs.
HILL, GEOFFREY Rev.
HODGKIN, T. Mr. D. C. L.
JOHNSTON, JAMES Rev.
*LLOYD, C. M.
MEYER, ROLLO Rev.
MORTON, R. H. A. Rev.
NEWMAN, ARTHUR E. T. Rev.
SYMONDS, ARTHUR G. Mr.
TORR, H. J.* Mr.
*YOUNG Lady

AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES
WITH THE COMMITTEE’S WORK

ADDERLEY, JAMES Hon. and Rev.
ALLEN, C. P. MP
*ARMITAGE, ROBERT MP
ASHLEY, EVELYN Rt. Hon.
ASHTON, T. G. MP
*BARING, GODFREY MP
*BARRATT, FRANCIS L. MP
BEAUCHAMP Rt. Hon. Earl
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOND, EDWARD</td>
<td>Rev. Prebendary</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRISTOW, RHODES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*BRODIE, HENRY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*BRUNNER, J. F. L.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*BRYNMOR JONES, D.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUXTON, T. F.</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*BYLES, W. P.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CHANCE, F. W.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANNING, F. A.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CHANNING, FRANCIS (Above ?)</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CORBETT, C. H.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*COTTON, HENRY</td>
<td>MP</td>
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<tr>
<td>*COWAN, W. H.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREMER, W. R.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROMBIE, J. W.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DALRYMPL, C.</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*DILKE, CHARLES</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*DUNCAN, J. HASTINGS</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*DUNN, A. E.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURHAM</td>
<td>Rt. Rev. The Bishop of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELLIS, J. E.</td>
<td>Rt. Hon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*EVERETT, R. L.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*FABER, G. H.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY, EDWARD</td>
<td>Rt. Hon. Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLADSTONE, STEPHEN</td>
<td>Rev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANT, CORRIE</td>
<td>*K. C., MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAY, ERNEST</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREENE, RAYMOND*</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*GREENWOOD, G. G.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*GULLAND, J. W.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GURDON, W. BRAMPTON</td>
<td>Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALDANE, R. B.</td>
<td>Rt. Hon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDIE, J. KEIR</td>
<td>K. C., MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*HART-DAVIES, T.</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVERSHAM</td>
<td>Lord</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*HERBERT, ARNOLD MP
*HILL, CLEMENT Sir MP
HOBHOUSE, W. Rev.
*HODGE, JOHN MP
HOPE, JOHN D. MP
HOWARD, JOSEPH MP
*KEKEWICH, G. W. Sir MP
KENNAWAY, JOHN Rt. Hon. Sir Bart., MP
*KING, A. J. MP
KINNAIRD Lord
*LAMB, E. H. MP
LAWRENCE, H. T. W. Sir Bart.
*LEHMANN, R. C. MP
* LEVY LEVER, A. MP
*LEVY, MAURICE MP
LODGE, OLIVER Sir
*LUPTON, ARNOLD MP
*MacDONALD, J. RAMSEY [sic] MP
*McCALLUM, JOHN M. MP
MEYER, F. B. Rev.
MONKSWELL Lord
MONTEAGLE Lord
*MORGAN, G. HAY MP
MOSS, SAMUEL* MP
POLWARTH The Master of
*PRICE, C. E. MP
REA, RUSSELL MP
REEVES, W. P. Hon.
*RENDALL, ATHELSTAN MP
*RICHARDS, T. F. MP
RICKETT, J. COMPTON MP
*ROBERTS, CHARLES MP
ROBERTS, J. H. MP
*ROBERTSON, JOHN M. MP
ROCHESTER* Rt. Rev. The Bishop of
*SHACKLETON, D. J. MP
*SIMON, J. A. MP
*SOUTHWARK Rt. Rev. The Bishop of
SMITH, H. CRAWFORD MP*
SOAMES, A. W. MP
STEWART, MARK Sir Bart., MP*
STAMFORD Earl of
*STRAUSS, B. S. MP
*STRAUSS, E. A. MP
TAYLOR, T. C. MP
THRING* Lord
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE Rev. The Master of
TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD* The President of
WEIR, J. G. MP
WHITE, GEORGE MP
*WILES, T. MP
*WILLIAMS, R. MP
WILSON, H. J. MP
*WILSON, JOHN MP

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS

AGNOLETTI, Signor, FLORENCE
BERARD, Monsieur VICTOR, PARIS. Editor of Revue de Paris.
*FERRARIS, Signor, ROME.
*FOA, RUDOLFO, Dr., ROME.
GAULIS, Monsieur GEORGES, PARIS.
GUILIANO, IL MARCHESE DI SAN, Signor* ROME. Deputato al Parlamento.
MAZZINI, PIETRO, Signor, PARIS.
MONETA, ERNESTO TEODORO, Signor, MILAN. Presidente Comitato Pro Armenia.
PRESSENSE, Monsieur F. de, PARIS. Chambre des Deputes.
REYNOLDS, J. B., NEW YORK.
TATARCHEFF, C., Dr.*, SOFIA, BULGARIA.
TATARCHEFF, J. B., Dr.*, SOFIA, BULGARIA.
QUILLARD, Monsieur P., PARIS. French Armenian Committee.
VILLARI, S. P. Signor, FLORENCE.
Notes

(3) See Appendices 1, 2, and 3. The specific biographical identification of Radicals in the early years of the 20th century has been detailed in an article in this series '2004 March'. Therefore the lists of Radicals have been reproduced here, as Appendices 1 and 2, for the convenience of the reader. Appendix 3 has been added as fresh information to show those having a special interest in the affairs of the Near East. Please note that not absolutely all those listed for the Balkan Committee were Radicals.
(8) ibid, p. 5.
(9) Bernard Porter, Critics Of Empire (1968), pp. 84–85.
(13) Stephen McKenna, Reginald McKenna 1863-1943 (1948), pp. 54–56.
(17) ibid, pp. 3–4.
(20) Originally in the Contemporary Review of July and August 1901.
(24) ‘It was on Monday, December 11, 1905, that I had gone to Buckingham Palace to receive the seals of office. It was on Monday, December 11, 1916, that I went to Buckingham Palace to give up the seals - a curious coincidence of date and day of the week.’ Grey of Fallofon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (1925), Vol. 2, p. 249.
26 I do not believe this to be mere coincidence but planned by Grey. This is further evidence to support the theory being put forward in this article relating to the type of personality that he had. Notice too, not only the 11th day of the month but also after 11 years in office.
29 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (1933), Vol. 1, p. 91.
Grey to Buxton. 31 Dec. 1895, quoted in ibid, p. 205.
32 ibid, p. 206.
33 ibid, p. 207.
Grey to Haldane, 4 Dec. 1899.
35 Times, 31 May 1901.
36 ibid, 29 Nov. 1901.
37 ibid, 7 Feb. 1902.
39 George Macaulay Trevelyan, Grey Of Falldon (1937), p. 84.
Grey to Munro Ferguson, 13 August 1905.
45 18 Sept. 1906, ibid, pp. 389-390.
48 Sir Edward Grey's first trip abroad as Foreign Secretary was in April 1914 to Paris to accompany George V on the Royal visit to mark the 10th anniversary of the creation of the Anglo-French Entente.
59 T. P. Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy From A Back Bench 1904-1918 (1932), p. 82.
63 ibid, p. 88.